Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over-the-counter bond market. I find average round-trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower-rated bonds.     

Understanding the motivations of long-term care insurance owners: the importance of retirement planning

This article is based on two recent reports by the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) that illuminate the reasons why individuals purchase private long-term care insurance in both the group and individual markets. This information suggests that a younger and more diverse group of individuals are becoming increasingly interested in private long-term care insurance and that workplace education linkage the purchase of long-term care insurance to retirement planning may promote coverage.     

DO FIRMS SEEK A TARGET BOARD STRUCTURE? EVIDENCE FROM THE POST‐SOX PERIOD

We investigate whether firms restructure board composition to align with changes in their contracting environment. Board size and independence increase with firm complexity, consistent with theoretical predictions. However, the hypothesized negative relation between board independence and information costs is evident only for firms completing acquisitions. Furthermore, board independence increases to offset increases in CEO power in a sample of firms making acquisitions, but decreases when CEO power increases in a large cross‐section of firms. We conclude that after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, firms face constraints adjusting to target board structure, but these constraints can be mitigated by a shock to the contracting environment via acquisition.     

Management and policy issues in China's rural development 1977–81

China's rural development policy has divided the Chinese leadership since the mid-fifties. Since about mid-1977 Deng Xiaoping has been in the ascendancy. In the rural areas he has striven to rapidly introduce a number of far-reaching policles. These policies are discussed in the following article and the likelihood of the continuing implementation of Deng's line assessed.     

Import Protection Bias

Rodrik (1995) notes that trade regimes tend to be biased towards import protection, while the standard political economy models either yield no prediction on the bias of the trade regime or predict, counterfactually, a bias towards the export sector. This constitutes an important shortcoming in the political economy of trade literature. In this paper, the Grossman and Helpman (1994 ) “Protection for Sale” model is extended by adding government expenditure. This expenditure may be financed via a combination of tariff revenue and a distorting wage tax. In addition to the government expenditure, export subsidies need to be financed either via tariff revenue or a distorting wage tax. With this addition, plausible values of the model's parameters yield import protection bias.     

Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A Boundaryless Responsibility? <Emphasis Type=Italic>Clarifications,Exceptions and Implications</Emphasis>

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business concept in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its way to globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist world order, typified in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits uncomfortably in this capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the global reach of their supply chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent along these chains. The possibility of irresponsible practices puts global firms under pressure to protect their brands even if it means assuming responsibilities for the practices of their suppliers. Pressure groups understand this burden on firms and try to take advantage of the situation. This article seeks to challenge the often taken-for-granted-assumption that firms should be accountable for the practices of their suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of the concept of responsibility. Except where corporate control and or corporate grouping exist, it identifies the use of power as a critical factor to be considered in allocating responsibility in firm–supplier relationship; and suggests that the more powerful in this relationship has a responsibility to exert some moral influence on the weaker party. The article highlights the use of code of conducts, corporate culture, anti-pressure group campaigns, personnel training and value reorientation as possible sources of wielding positive moral influence along supply chains.     

Currency Unions in Africa: Is the Trade Effect Substantial Enough to Justify their Formation?

Using estimates that currency unions double trade, we quantify the welfare effects of forming currency unions for the African regional economic communities and for the African Union as a whole. The potential increase in trade is shown to be small, and much less than that resulting from the adoption of the euro. Allowing for increased African trade does not overturn the negative assessment of African currency unions, due to asymmetries in countries’ terms‐of‐trade shocks and their degree of fiscal discipline.