Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints

This paper examines a large, randomly chosen, sample of bond indentures focusing on the constraints they set on dividend payments that have the potential to transfer wealth from the bondholders (i.e., payments which are financed by a new debt issue or reduced investment). The nature of these restrictions support the hypothesis that bond convenants are structured to control the conflict of interest between stockholders and bondholders. Further, the empirical evidence suggests that these constraints are not binding — i.e., stockholders do not pay themselves as much dividends as they are allowed to. Explanations of this puzzling empirical regularity are suggested.     

ISOLATING THE WILD CARD OPTION

Many embedded options are difficult to value the wild card option in the Treasury bond futures contract is one of these embedded options. We illustrate how narrow theoretical bounds on the value of this option, relative to the price of the contract, may be obtained in the presence of other embedded options. Simulations suggest that the value of the wild card option is close to zero. This implies that, in this economy, a simpler pricing model of the Treasury bond futures contract, which ignores the wild card option, will result in only a small loss of accuracy.     

Scale and scope economies for drug abuse treatment costs: evidence for Washington State

Drug abuse treatment has been pervasive in the US in the recent years, and the associated direct treatment costs approached $18 billion in 2001. However, there have been few published studies on scale economies, and none on scope economies, for drug abuse treatment costs. We estimate a restricted cost function for 17 hospitals in Washington State that provided inpatient and/or outpatient drug abuse treatment during the years 1997–2004. We find significant evidence of scale economies for hospitals that provide only outpatient drug abuse treatment services. The marginal costs of outpatient services are even smaller for hospitals that produce both outpatient and inpatient drug abuse treatment services. Further, these joint-production hospitals exhibit diseconomies of scope, or specialization economies. These results all imply that recent trends towards additional outpatient treatment services will enhance cost efficiency.