Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries

While the mainstream of economic development theory focuses on the efficiency of policy measures, the role of the credibility of these measures is rarely analyzed. In this paper we argue that in less developed countries the problem of establishing the credibility of policy measures is at least as important as the problem of choosing the efficient policy solution. We claim that many of the difficulties less developed countries face can be understood in terms of lack of effective control on the discretionary power of governments, which ultimately leads to policies that are not credible. The private sector anticipates large swings in policies and reacts by withholding its resources. Symptoms of these credibility problems in less developed countries include the size of the informal sector, capital flight, and the reluctance of investors to commit capital. All of these reactions contribute to the slow economic growth in these countries. This paper concludes that establishing strategies for the control of state discretionary power is a crucial precondition for overcoming these problems and generating long term economic growth.     

Connectivity in the Commercial Internet

We study the 'backbone market' in the Internet. After discussing the structure of the Internet, we use an extension of the Katz-Shapiro network model to analyze the strategies that would be used by dominant backbone. We show that a larger backbone prefers a lower quality interconnection than the smaller one. We then analyze a 'targeted degradation' strategy where the larger backbone lowers the quality of interconnection to its smaller rivals in turn. Finally, we show that the qualitative results are robust to the possibility of 'multihoming' by clients.     

Optimal risk sharing with non-monotone monetary functionals

We consider the problem of sharing pooled risks among n economic agents endowed with non-necessarily monotone monetary functionals. In this framework, results of characterization and existence of optimal solutions are easily obtained as extensions from the convex risk measures setting. Moreover, the introduction of the best monotone approximation of non-monotone functionals allows us to compare the original problem with the one which involves only ad hoc monotone criteria. The explicit calculation of optimal risk sharing rules is provided for particular cases, when agents are endowed with well-known preference relations.      

Basel II and bank lending to emerging markets: Evidence from the German banking sector

This paper investigates whether the new Basel Accord will induce a change in bank lending to emerging markets using a comprehensive new data set on German banks’ foreign exposure. We test two interlinked hypotheses on the conditions under which the change in the regulatory capital would leave lending flows unaffected. This would be the case if (i) the new regulatory capital requirement remains below the economic capital and (ii) banks’ economic capital to emerging markets already adequately reflects risk. On both accounts the evidence indicates that the new Basel Accord should have a limited effect on lending to emerging markets.     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

Influential listeners: An experiment on persuasion bias in social networks

This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for repetitions in the information they receive. We find that, after repeated communication within a social network, social influence depends not only on being listened to by many others, but also on listening to many others. We show that persuasion bias can be viewed as an extreme case of a generalized boundedly rational updating rule in which agents receive more or less attention depending on how many other agents they listen to. The results indicate that behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule according to which agents' social influence is proportional to their indegree.     

The MISSCARE Survey-Turkish: psychometric properties and findings

One measure of the process of nursing care is missed nursing care, which refers to any aspect of required care that is omitted either in part or in whole or delayed. Little is understood about how the quality and processes of nursing care differs among countries around the world. The aims of this study were (a) to test the psychometric properties of the MISSCARE Survey-Turkish and (b) to compare the extent and type of missed care as well as reasons for missing care between Turkey and the United States. There was less missed care reported by Turkish nurses as compared to U.S. nurses (p < 0.0001). Turkey nurses identified more problems with inadequate staffing resources (p < 0.0001), materials resources (p < 0.0001), and communication/teamwork (p < 0.0001) as reasons for missed nursing care than did U.S. nurses. Missed nursing care is a critical problem that needs to be addressed in both countries.     

Competition Policy towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United States

Following a brief review of the economic analysis of vertical restraints, we discuss current policy standards in both Europe and the United States. Since 1981, U.S. policy towards these restraints has been lax, and no restraints were challenged during the 12-year period between January 1981 and January 1993. More recently, the pendulum has shifted back somewhat and there is renewed interest by enforcement officials in this area. In contrast, European policy standards have been more stringent, and have paid particular attention to vertically imposed restraints that can limit trade among member countries. To a large part, their different treatment may primarily reflect the lack of consensus as to their long-run economic consequences. Consistent policy standards across jurisdictions are not likely to arise until there is general consensus as to the economic implications of these restraints.     

Employability and the psychological contract in European ICT sector SMEs

This article explores the employability of information and communication technology (ICT) professionals from the perspective of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The first stage of analysis, based on over 100 interviews with managers of ICT supplier companies in seven European countries (Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the UK), showed most SMEs to have a generally ad hoc approach to managing the employability of their ICT professionals. Assessment and development plans were used primarily to keep skills current to business needs; however, the more developed northern European markets showed greater awareness of the ‘high commitment’ benefits of a more sophisticated approach towards career management (e.g. through mentoring or career planning). A second stage of analysis based only on UK interviews builds on this to propose a model of positive employer influence on psychological contracts through career and employability management practices.