Optimal Management of Soil Quality Stocks and Long-Term Consequences of Land Degradation for Smallholder Farmers in Malawi

While soil degradation has long-term consequences, static models which form the bulk of studies on this topic in Africa, do not account for the inter-temporal dimensions of optimal resource management. This paper used an inter-temporal optimisation framework, which considered soil in a time-dependent resource extraction perspective. We have demonstrated that soil degradation is causing an enormous reduction in productive value of smallholder land in Malawi. Current user cost of soil quality among smallholder farmers, which represents annual loss in productive value of land, was estimated to be US$21 per hectare. Based on this value and land area under smallholder agriculture in Malawi, economic costs of soil degradation among smallholder farmers were estimated to amount to 14% of the agricultural GDP for Malawi. Although smallholder farmers’ current practices are sub-optimal to Steady State solutions, they are above static solutions. This demonstrates that smallholder farmers have some private incentives to invest in the soil quality stock. Smallholder farmers internalise some of the dynamic costs of soil degradation under the current practices. However, a sensitivity analysis on a slightly higher discount rate indicates that SS solutions closely resemble the prevailing smallholder farming practices. This suggests that smallholder farmers may be overexploiting soil quality stock because they have a high time preference. That is, they value the current consumption more than their future consumption and wellbeing. High levels of poverty in Malawi and serious lack of viable alternatives to subsistence farming may be influencing such behaviour. Promoting more viable land use alternatives than subsistence farming and formuling policies that help transform smallholder agriculture into a profitable enterprise will not only increase the cost of degrading the soil, but also encourage farmers to invest in the soil quality stock.     

The hydroelectricity consumption and economic growth in Asian countries - evidence using an asymmetric cointegration approach

ABSTRACT

This study examines the four commonly tested hypotheses in hydroelectricity consumption – economic growth literature for 12 Asian countries. Our results from a recently developed hidden cointegration technique uncover rich and significant relationships between negative and positive components of the variables under consideration. In particular, we find evidence to support the neutrality hypothesis in five countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand), the growth hypothesis in four countries (India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), and both growth and conservation hypotheses in three countries (China, Malaysia, and New Zealand). These findings suggest that appropriate economic policies should be elaborated on the basis of the country’s specific hydroelectricity consumption–growth nexus. Finally, our new evidence suggests that the lack of stable relationship between hydroelectricity consumption and economic growth documented in previous studies for some of these countries could be due to the failure to properly account for the nonlinearity property in the data.     

Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.     

On the Role of Weight Restrictions in Data Envelopment Analysis

This paper examines the role that weight restrictions play in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It is argued that the decision to include a factor (input or output) in a DEA model represents an implicit judgement that the factor has a non-trivial weight. It therefore seems perverse to allow DEA to assign a trivial weight to that factor in assessing the efficiency of a unit. There is therefore a strong case for imposing restrictions on factor weights. However, many existing methods of weight restriction are in practice unwieldy. This paper proposes an alternative approach we term contingent weight restriction which is both practical and intellectually consistent with the DEA philosophy. The paper explores the implications of alternative methods of weight restriction using simulated data from a well known production process.     

How useful are signals? A micro-structure analysis

We analyze how the market processes a signaling event by studying a sample of self-tender offers, events often viewed as signals of firm value. By examining changes in the degree of informed trading, we find asymmetric information costs fall at announcement, remain low throughout the event, and increase at offer expiration. By one month following expiration, informed trading returns to a level not significantly different from that prior to the offer. Higher risk firms have significantly larger declines in information asymmetry during the offer. Increases in information asymmetry persist one month following expiration for firms with lower pre-offer informed trading. (JEL G14, G32)     

Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain

During a time when religious animosities were reaching their peak in Medieval Europe leading up to the violent crusades, Christians, Jews, and Muslims residing in close proximity in Medieval Spain experienced a period of relative peace, prosperity, and cultural exchange. This historical episode, referred to as La Convivencia, or the coexistence, is a puzzle to many period historians. This paper argues that this anomalistic period arose due to the emergence of commerce, which generated cooperation and mitigated conflict among these heterogeneous groups, à la the Doux-Commerce Thesis of the Scottish Enlightenment. Commercial exchange between Christians, Jews, and Muslims was established through the use of safe-conducts, a promise of protection sold to foreign merchants. This paper details the operation of safe-conducts and the civilizing role that commerce played among Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Medieval Spain.     

Run theorems for low returns and large banks

In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, 1983) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that sufficiently large banks are always susceptible to a run. One interpretation of the condition is that exposure to runs occurs when desire for consumption smoothing or predictability of preference profiles are relatively high.     

On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk-dominant. Thus the endogenous network structure not only has implications for the interaction pattern that emerges, but it also has a significant impact on the play in the coordination game relative to what would arise if the same interaction network were exogenous.