Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

This paper examines the relation between incentive pay, monitoring, and regulatory requirements in banks. Using a one-period model with asymmetrical information between the bank owner and the top management team, as well as within the team itself, we show that (1) incentive pay increases the mutual-monitoring activity among top executives; (2) senior executives, especially the CEO, collect more incentive pay than their subordinates; and (3) bank regulations, such as capital adequacy (CAD) requirements, reduce the absolute amount of incentive pay granted to executives.     

Short Run Constraints and the Increasing Marginal Value of Time in Recreation

Leisure activities such as local recreation trips usually take place in discrete blocks of time that are surrounded by time devoted to other commitments. It can be costly to transfer time between blocks to allow for longer outings. These observations affect the value of time within those blocks and suggest that traditional methods for valuing time using labor markets miss important considerations. This paper presents a new model for time valuation that uses non-employment time commitments to infer the shadow value of time spent in recreation. A unique survey that elicited revealed and stated preference data on household time allocation is used to implement the model. The results support the conclusion that there is an increasing marginal value of time for recreation as the trip length increases.     

Political regimes,business cycles,seasonalities, and returns

This paper provides a method for testing for regime differences when regimes are long-lasting. Standard testing procedures are generally inappropriate because regime persistence causes a spurious regression problem – a problem that has led to incorrect inference in a broad range of studies involving regimes representing political, business, and seasonal cycles. The paper outlines analytically how standard estimators can be adjusted for regime dummy variable persistence. While the adjustments are helpful asymptotically, spurious regression remains a problem in small samples and must be addressed using simulation or bootstrap procedures. We provide a simulation procedure for testing hypotheses in situations where an independent variable in a time-series regression is a persistent regime dummy variable. We also develop a procedure for testing hypotheses in situations where the dependent variable has similar properties.     

Deposit market competition,wholesale funding,and bank risk

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.