A market model of analysts’ opinions to explain changes in the dispersion of opinions

The demand for and supply of analysts’ opinions in this model yield an equilibrium that demonstrates how the information content of the opinions reacts to changes in exogenous parameters. The model also shows how changes in the parameters make analysts’ opinions more or less dispersed; for example, a decline in investor risk aversion, a decrease in market volatility, and an increase in information costs can lead to analysts’ opinions becoming more similar. Recognizing how exogenous factors can affect the supply and demand of analysts’ opinions gives additional insights into questions concerning what may appear to be herd behavior by analysts and also the relationship between forecast dispersion and information content. (JEL: G29, C71)     

Immobiliencontrolling — Optimierung der immobilienbezogenen Kosten durch Gründung einer Generalmietgesellschaft

Ohne Zusammenfassung Dipl.-Ing. (univ.) Michael Belau ist Director und Head of Rental Management Dipl.-Wirtschaftsing. (FH) Michael Schildger ist Vice President und Head of Finance Dr. Verena Sturm ist Manager Corporate Real Estate Services     

Valuation, optimal asset allocation and retirement incentives of pension plans

We provide a framework in which we link the valuation and assetallocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetimemarginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pensionplan formula. In turn, we examine the retirement policies thatare implied by the primitives of the model and the value ofpension obligations. Our model provides an explicit valuationformula for a stylized defined benefits plan. The optimal assetallocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio independentof the pension liabilities. We show that the worker with retirewhen the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reachesa critical value which depends on the parameters of the pensionplan and the discount rate. Using numerical techniques we analyzethe feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuationof plans and on the asset allocation decisions.     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).     

A conceptual framework of anonymity in Group Support Systems

As the development and use of automated systems for collaborative work grows, the need for a better understanding of these systems becomes more important. Our focus is on one type of system, a Group Support System (GSS) and, in particular, on one important aspect of a GSS—anonymity. A conceptual framework for the study of anonymity in a GSS is presented, which describes the general classes of variables and their relationships. These variables include the factors that influence anonymity in a GSS, types of anonymity, and the effects of anonymity on a message sender, receiver, group process, and outcome. Each of these variables is discussed with working propositions presented for important group process and outcome measures. The objectives of this article are to highlight the importance and complexity of anonymity, to act as a guide for empirical investigations of anonymity, and to influence future GSS development and use.     

Classification and aggregation: An application to industrial classification in cps data

In this paper we offer a method for deciding how to aggregate a set of elementary industries. The method is then applied to the problem of estimating a wage equation that allows for industry-specific effects. Our method explicitly formalizes the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and parsimony implicit in an aggregation problem. By varying the parameter of the assumed loss function, one obtains a whole sequence of aggregation levels. Further, the resulting sequence is consistent; that is, groupings formed at one level of aggregation will never be undone when one aggregates further.     

On the Role of Futures Trading in Spot Market Fluctuations: Perpetrator of Volatility or Victim of Regret?

We examine the role of index futures trading in spot market volatility. We use the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) approach to measure volatility, analyze causality and feedback relations between volatilities in the spot and futures markets, and test various hypotheses in the context of a multivariate model that incorporates other macrostate variables. Our empirical results suggest index futures trading may not be blamed for the observed volatility in the spot market. Rather, we find stronger and more consistent support for the alternative posture that volatility in the futures market is an outgrowth of a turbulent cash market. We use the regret (cognitive dissonance) theory to explain our results.     

On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001