Adoption des Politiques de Protection de l'Environnement et performance des Entreprises Camerounaises

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the environmental protection policies of by Cameroonian firms on their performance. It uses the endogenous switching regression technique and propensity scores applied to micro-data from 639 firms in Cameroon. The results show that only 17% of firms adopt these measures, while on average 85% of firms produce solid, gaseous or liquid waste. The results also indicate that the adoption of these environmental protection policies increases operating costs while significantly improving the turnover and the performance of the productive capacity of the company. These increases are 39.11%, 58.6%, and 38.63% for operating costs, turnover and return on productive capacity of the company, respectively. However, firms can also suffer significant losses resulting from the non-adoption of environmental policies. In fact, firms that do not adopt environmental protection policies have their performance reduced by an average of 1.625 percentage points.     

Banking Regulation and Collateral Screening in a Model of Information Asymmetry

Journal of Financial Services Research - This paper explores the impact of banking regulation on a competitive credit market with ex-ante asymmetric information and aggregate uncertainty. I...     

Doing Good While Behaving Badly: Checkout Charity Process Mechanisms

Journal of Business Ethics - Companies are increasingly using cause-related marketing campaigns to engage consumers during the purchase process and highlight their own corporate social...     

Alliance Strategies of Small Firms

The paper concludes that small firms follow one of two alliance strategies. When the firms are small relative to their rivals and to their market, they tend to use alliances to gain economies of scale and scope; when they are large in relative terms, they avoid alliances. This behavior is consistent with alliance usage by large firms. The paper also analyzes the sources of profit for a small firm that uses a "constellation" of allies to compete in a scale-intensive industry. Its profits depend on a combination of the group-based advantages generated by the constellation, and the share of these profits that the firm can appropriate from the group. Small firms face particular hazards in this regard when their bargaining power within their constellation is weak. The paper illustrates these arguments with data froma small survey, with case studies from the computer industry, and with a simple mathematical model.     

Eurokrise: Erneute Atempause ist kein Grund zum Ausruhen

The current state of affairs in the euro area (EA) instills hope in economic recovery but also substantial concern. The crisis countries have made considerable, albeit quite uneven, progress in central areas of reform. Yet severe obstacles remain. Moreover, European policy makers have reformed the EA’s institutional framework to strengthen its resilience. Yet important elements of a stable architecture are still missing, and it remains unclear whether the EA is moving towards full integration or a Maastricht 2.0. Most importantly, since it has become impossible to construct a viable fi scal bridge due to the success of the OMT programme, now everything depends on the perseverance of domestic reform policies.     

The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws

Using data on political spending in state elections, this study considers the role of political contributions by healthcare professional interest groups in states' decisions to enact occupational licensing laws. These laws govern how different professions may operate in healthcare markets, and while they ostensibly exist to protect consumers, licensing laws can also insulate professionals from competition in healthcare markets. Higher political spending by physician interest groups increases the probability that a state maintains licensing laws restricting the practices of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs). Conversely, increased spending by hospital interest groups increases the probability that a state allows NPs and PAs to practice with more autonomy. Nurse groups, which include groups affiliated with NPs, have a smaller effect on licensing laws. And nonphysician groups, which include groups affiliated with PAs, have almost no effect on licensing laws. These results are consistent with the investment theory of political spending.     

On Option-Pricing Models in Real Estate: A Critique

This paper considers the problems peculiar to options on real estate, because of the special set of institutional factors influencing real estate markets. It is intended to serve as a reply to Johnson and Wofford [15] as well as provide an overall critique of option-pricing models in a real estate context. Our major point is that a variety of real estate decisions, such as the abandonment decision, the option to refinance, or the option to exercise a contingent real estate purchase contract, may be modeled using option-pricing techniques. However, both the theoretical and institutional aspects of real estate markets must be taken into account in both developing and applying option models in a real estate context.