Using uncensored communication channels to divert spam traffic

We analyze a simple, feasible improvement to the current email system using an uncensored (open) communication channel. Such a channel could be an email folder or account, to which properly tagged commercial solicitations are routed without filtering along the way. We characterize the circumstances under which senders would voluntarily move much of their spam into the open channel, leaving the traditional email channel dominated by person-to-person mail. We then show that under certain conditions all email recipients are better off when an open channel is introduced. Only recipients wanting spam will use the open channel enjoying the less disguised messages and cheaper sale prices, and for all recipients the dissatisfaction associated with both undesirable mail received and desirable mail filtered out decreases.     

Alliance Strategies of Small Firms

The paper concludes that small firms follow one of two alliance strategies. When the firms are small relative to their rivals and to their market, they tend to use alliances to gain economies of scale and scope; when they are large in relative terms, they avoid alliances. This behavior is consistent with alliance usage by large firms. The paper also analyzes the sources of profit for a small firm that uses a "constellation" of allies to compete in a scale-intensive industry. Its profits depend on a combination of the group-based advantages generated by the constellation, and the share of these profits that the firm can appropriate from the group. Small firms face particular hazards in this regard when their bargaining power within their constellation is weak. The paper illustrates these arguments with data froma small survey, with case studies from the computer industry, and with a simple mathematical model.     

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking “stability inefficiency” derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets.     

Eurokrise: Erneute Atempause ist kein Grund zum Ausruhen

The current state of affairs in the euro area (EA) instills hope in economic recovery but also substantial concern. The crisis countries have made considerable, albeit quite uneven, progress in central areas of reform. Yet severe obstacles remain. Moreover, European policy makers have reformed the EA’s institutional framework to strengthen its resilience. Yet important elements of a stable architecture are still missing, and it remains unclear whether the EA is moving towards full integration or a Maastricht 2.0. Most importantly, since it has become impossible to construct a viable fi scal bridge due to the success of the OMT programme, now everything depends on the perseverance of domestic reform policies.     

The response of vital rates to harvest fluctuations in pre-industrial Sweden

This study examines whether there was a Malthusian equilibrium mechanism in Sweden in the pre-industrial period. A unique data set on harvests, deaths, marriages and births going back to 1630 is used to calculate cumulative elasticities of vital rates with respect to harvest. While earlier studies have mostly focused on the impact of real wage, this study uses the calorie content of per capita harvests as an indicator of living standards. It finds that there indeed was a response of vital rates to harvest fluctuations, but there were important structural breaks. While positive checks attenuated after 1720, preventive checks were strengthened. After 1870 preventive checks disappeared, and possibly also positive checks. The results are robust to different models and trend specifications, with one crucial difference: while the distributed lag model shows that positive checks were significant up to 1920, the SVAR model shows that positive checks disappeared after 1870.     

The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws

Using data on political spending in state elections, this study considers the role of political contributions by healthcare professional interest groups in states' decisions to enact occupational licensing laws. These laws govern how different professions may operate in healthcare markets, and while they ostensibly exist to protect consumers, licensing laws can also insulate professionals from competition in healthcare markets. Higher political spending by physician interest groups increases the probability that a state maintains licensing laws restricting the practices of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs). Conversely, increased spending by hospital interest groups increases the probability that a state allows NPs and PAs to practice with more autonomy. Nurse groups, which include groups affiliated with NPs, have a smaller effect on licensing laws. And nonphysician groups, which include groups affiliated with PAs, have almost no effect on licensing laws. These results are consistent with the investment theory of political spending.     

Research notes and communications strategic planning as competitive advantage

Since 1970, over forty empirical studies have examined the performance consequences of formal strategic planning. This line of research has drawn heavy criticism from reviewers on methodological grounds, and has produced confusing, apparently contradictory results. This article reevaluates the planning-performance relationship from a resource perspective, arguing that strategic planning does not satisfy the criteria for sustainable competitive advantage– although it may produce economic value, it is easily imitated and may be substitutable. The article suggests that previous studies produced inconsistent results because they did not account for the dissemination of strategic planning over time, or for industry differences in strategic planning factor markets. An empirical test in two industries finds that formal strategic planning and financial performance are unrelated in a ‘planning equilibrium’ industry, but positively related in an industry with strategic planning factor market imperfections.     

On Option-Pricing Models in Real Estate: A Critique

This paper considers the problems peculiar to options on real estate, because of the special set of institutional factors influencing real estate markets. It is intended to serve as a reply to Johnson and Wofford [15] as well as provide an overall critique of option-pricing models in a real estate context. Our major point is that a variety of real estate decisions, such as the abandonment decision, the option to refinance, or the option to exercise a contingent real estate purchase contract, may be modeled using option-pricing techniques. However, both the theoretical and institutional aspects of real estate markets must be taken into account in both developing and applying option models in a real estate context.