Good students,avid readers: The cost of academic success

The effects of reading habits on academic performances have been carefully investigated, but little is known about the effects of academic achievements on students’ leisure reading. This paper investigates this issue by estimating the effects of academic achievements, proxied by the number of exams passed, on leisure reading, measured by the number of leisure books read in a year. Using an online survey submitted to the students at the University of Bologna, Italy, we adopt a two-step control-function technique to control for endogeneity. The empirical evidence suggests the existence of a negative relationship between students’ academic achievements and the time devoted to leisure reading. This result holds for students of different fields of study and is stronger for male students. The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition supports the existence of a gender-specific idiosyncratic effect.     

A flexible lattice framework for valuing options on assets paying discrete dividends and variable annuities embedding GMWB riders

In a market where a stochastic interest rate component characterizes asset dynamics, we propose a flexible lattice framework to evaluate and manage options on equities paying discrete dividends and variable annuities presenting some provisions, like a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit. The framework is flexible in that it allows to combine financial and demographic risk, to embed in the contract early exercise features, and to choose the dynamics for interest rates and traded assets. A computational problem arises when each dividend (when valuing an option) or withdrawal (when valuing a variable annuity) is paid, because the lattice lacks its recombining structure. The proposed model overcomes this problem associating with each node of the lattice a set of representative values of the underlying asset (when valuing an option) or of the personal subaccount (when valuing a variable annuity) chosen among all the possible ones realized at that node. Extensive numerical experiments confirm the model accuracy and efficiency.

     

Upstream conduct and price authority with competing organizations

We characterize the degree of price authority that competing upstream principals award their downstream agents in a setting where these agents own private information about demand and incur nonverifiable distribution costs. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and design “permission sets” from which agents choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping delegation and the constraints imposed on equilibrium prices. When principals behave noncooperatively, agents are biased toward excessively high prices because they pass on distribution costs to consumers. Hence, the permission set only features a price cap that is more likely to bind as products become closer substitutes, in sectors where distribution is sufficiently costly, and when demand is not too volatile. By contrast, when principals behave cooperatively, the optimal delegation scheme is richer and more complex. Because principals want to charge the monopoly price, the optimal permission set features a price floor when the distribution cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is high enough, a price cap is optimal. Surprisingly, while competition (as captured by stronger product substitutability) hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite occurs when principals maximize industry profit.     

Gender preference gaps and voting for redistribution

Experimental Economics - There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of...     

Bank business models,negative policy rates,and prudential regulation

Annals of Finance - Using data from Italian banks over the period 2011–2017, we study how negative interest rate policy and prudential regulation impact on bank business models. We report...     

The Evolution of Income Composition Inequality in Italy, 1989–2016

We study the evolution of inequality in income composition in terms of capital and labor income in Italy between 1989 and 2016. We document a rise in the share of capital income accruing to the bottom of the distribution, while the top of the distribution increases its share of labor income. This implies a falling degree of income composition inequality in the period considered and a weaker relationship between the functional and personal distribution of income in Italy. This result is robust to various specifications of self-employment income; nonetheless, it hinges crucially on the treatment of rental incomes. While the dynamics of imputed rents has brought about a more equitable distribution of capital incomes across the income distribution, that of actual rents has led to higher concentration of capital incomes at the top in the decade preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis. Finally, we conceptualize a rule of thumb for policy makers seeking to reduce income inequality in the long run.