Option Valuation with Information Costs: Theory and Tests

In this paper, the valuation of stock and index options is analyzed in the context of Merton's model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. It is possible to derive a partial differential equation for options in such a context. The derivation gives more understanding of the way an option's future payoff is discounted to the present. In order to estimate some of its parameters, the model is calibrated to market prices. It is tested using market prices and the authors' valuation formula. It is found that model prices are not significantly different from market prices, especially when out-of-the-money and deep-in-the-money options are considered. The model gives an explanation to the “strike bias” and the “smile effect.” Simulations of models based respectively on stochastic volatilities and gamma processes, are in accordance with the findings in this paper concerning biases in the Black and Scholes model, especially for pricing deep-in-the-money and out-of-the-money options. Even if the estimation method has its drawbacks, the costs of gathering and processing information regarding the option and its underlying asset play a central role in explaining the biases observed in the Black and Scholes model and help also the understanding of the U-shaped curve known as the smile of volatilities.     

Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions were created to oversee financial auditing. Based on a modified version of Lukes’ multidimensional model of power, we first investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulation of public accounting. Our findings strengthen the view that a “form of allegiance” was, at the time of data collection, developing between CPAB and the largest Canadian accounting firms. Through a second analytical movement, we extend the boundaries of our argument, showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. Our conclusion points, in particular, to the spatial gap - and incidentally the limitations - of any attempt to control and supervise a globalized industry from a national or regional perspective.     

Tests of Representative Firm Models: Results for German Manufacturing Industries

Many studies of producer behavior consider cost and input demand functions derived from microeconomic theory and estimate them on the basis of aggregate data. If the characteristics of the firms differ, the negligence of heterogeneity can lead to estimation bias. An alternative is to restrict individual behavioral functions to being linear in the firm specific parameters. The aim of this paper is to describe aggregate producer behavior without placing too strong restrictions on functional form and to explicitly account for firm heterogeneity. Estimation for German manufacturing sectors confirms that neglected heterogeneity is an important source of bias in representative firm models.     

On measuring synchronization of bulls and bears: The case of East Asia

This paper implements estimation and testing procedures for comovements of stock market “cycles” or “phases” in Asia. We extend the Harding and Pagan [Harding, D., Pagan, A.P., 2006. Synchronization of cycles. Journal of Econometrics 132 (1), 59–79] test for strong multivariate nonsynchronization (SMNS) between business cycles to a test that allows for an imperfect degree of multivariate synchronization between stock market cycles. Moreover, we propose a test for endogenously determining structural change in the bivariate and multivariate synchronization indices. Upon applying the technique to five Asian stock markets we find a significant increase in the cross country comovements of Asian bullish and bearish periods in 1997. A power study of the stability test suggests that the detected increase in comovement is more of a sudden nature (i.e. contagion or “Asian Flu”) instead of gradual (i.e. financial integration). It is furthermore argued that stock market cycles and their propensity toward (increased) synchronization contain useful information for both investors, policy makers and financial regulators.     

On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium

Cooperative behavior is often observed in ordinary market transactions. To account for this observation, Robert Sugden proposes a team reasoning theory in which the common interest of team reasoners is defined by the notion of mutually beneficial practice. We study the relationships between mutually beneficial practices and Berge equilibria (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). We propose two sufficient conditions under which a (strict) Berge equilibrium is a mutually beneficial practice.