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Charles?BellemareEmail author Bertrand?Melenberg Arthur?van?Soest 《Portuguese Economic Journal》2002,1(2):181-203
An overview is presented of some parametric and semi-parametric models, estimators, and specification tests that can be used to analyze ordered response variables. In particular, limited dependent variable models that generalize ordered probit are compared to regression models that generalize the linear model. These techniques are then applied to analyze how self-reported satisfaction with household income relates to household income, family composition, and other background variables. Data are drawn from the 1998 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. The results are used to estimate equivalence scales and the cost of children. We find that the standard ordered probit model is rejected, while some semi-parametric specifications survive specification tests against nonparametric alternatives. The estimated equivalence scales, however, are often similar for the parametric and semi-parametric specifications.JEL Classification:
C14, C35, D12Correspondence to: Charles BellemareWe are grateful to an anonymous referee and to participants of a CeMMAP/ESG workshop at University College London and seminars at CentER (Tilburg University) and Humboldt University Berlin for useful comments. 相似文献
174.
Abstract. The present paper thoroughly explores second‐best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we summarize the incidence of incentives on the economy with the notions of weak and strong adverse selection. Finally, we show in what sense improving risk perception enhances welfare. 相似文献
175.
This article studies the dynamics of an overlapping generations model with capital, money and cash-in-advance constraints. The economy can exhibit two different regimes. In the first one, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding and money is a dominated asset. In the second one, the constraint is strictly satisfied and money has the same return as capital. When the second regime holds on a finite number of periods, we say that the economy experiences a temporary bubble. We prove that temporary bubbles can exist in an economy, which would experience under-accumulation without money. We also show that cyclical bubbles may occur. 相似文献
176.
We resolve collective irrationality in the stability set, a solution concept for voting games proposed by Rubinstein (J Econ
Theory 23:150–159, 1980) to resolve the well-known paradox of voting in the core. A lack of cooperation within winning coalitions
prevents their members from eliminating an alternative globally less preferred to another one when they observe the rational
behavior defining the stability set. Allowing for the possibility of accompanying a coalitional vote with a binding solidarity
agreement is a natural response to this cooperation failure. This leads to a new standard of behavior and a new solution concept
called stability set with binding solidarity agreement or S
c
-stability set. It is shown that the S
c
-stability set and a newly defined version of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for simple games are not comparable with respect
to set inclusion. The S
c
-stability set includes the core, is included in the stability set and contains only Pareto-optimal alternatives. When individual
preferences are complete linear orders, the S
c
-stability set is always non-empty.
相似文献
177.