INDUSTRY PROSPECTS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS IN DIVERSIFYING TAKEOVERS

We use a sample of 816 diversifying takeovers from 1978 to 2003 to examine whether takeover announcements release negative information about the future prospects of the acquirer's main industry. We find that rivals that are most similar to the acquirer (homogeneous rivals) experience significant negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around takeover announcements. Takeovers that result in negative wealth effects to acquirers are associated with negative abnormal revisions in analysts' forecasts of homogeneous rivals' earnings per share. We also find a decline in the posttakeover operating performance of rival firms. The decline is especially pronounced for homogeneous rivals and for takeovers with negative wealth effects to acquirers. Our findings imply that CAR-based estimates of acquirer wealth gains from takeovers that do not account for industrywide information releases are significantly biased downward.     

So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship lender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries are significantly likely to obtain future loans from their relationship lenders. Relationship lenders are likely to be chosen to provide debt/equity underwriting services, but this effect is economically small.     

The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms

Extant empirical evidence indicates that the proportion of firms going public prior to achieving profitability has been increasing over time. This phenomenon is largely driven by an increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of these firms at the time of going public, identifying factors that influence their ability to attain key post-IPO milestones such as achieving profitability represents an important area of research. We employ a theoretical framework built around agency and signaling considerations to identify factors that influence the probability and timing of post-IPO profitability of Internet IPO firms. We estimate Cox Proportional Hazards models to test whether factors identified by our theoretical framework significantly impact the probability of post-IPO profitability as a function of time. We find that the probability of post-IPO profitability increases with pre-IPO investor demand and change in ownership at the IPO of the top officers and directors. On the other hand, the probability of post-IPO profitability decreases with the venture capital participation, proportion of outsiders on the board, and pre-market valuation uncertainty.     

Venture capitalist participation and the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms

Previous studies have identified the value-added potential of venture capitalist monitoring in the initial public offering (IPO) market. We test this proposition by comparing the post-issue operating performance of venture capitalist-backed IPOs with a matched sample of non-venture capitalist-backed IPOs. We find that venture capitalist-backed IPO firms exhibit relatively superior post-issue operating performance compared to non-venture capital-backed IPO firms. Further, the market appears to recognize the value of monitoring by venture capitalists as reflected in the higher valuations at the time of the IPO. Finally, we find that proxies for the quality of venture capitalist monitoring are positively related to post-issue operating performance.     

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.     

Role of the intellectuals in governance

Environmental degradation and lack of social cohesion are rooted in bad governance, which, in turn is rooted in the inability of the modern civilization to understand the nature of differences in human psychology and their relationship with governance. The key to good governance in future will lie in invigorating such individuals to ‘speak’ who have transcended their desires of money and power and are able to take a dispassionate view of the problems in the larger social good. Multiple networks of persons who speak the truth have to be formed for this purpose.     

Reforming Food Subsidy Schemes: Estimating the Gains from Self-targeting in India

The paper uses the theoretical framework of the theory of tax reform to analyze whether a “small” change in an existing food subsidy program can be both welfare‐improving and revenue‐neutral. It shows how existing econometric methods can be adapted to estimate demand parameters even when household‐level data exhibit little price variation because the government controls food prices. The methodology is used to estimate welfare changes from shifting a rupee of subsidy on existing commodities to coarse cereals in the Indian public distribution system.     

Vendor performance with supply risk: A chance-constrained DEA approach

The strategic importance of vendor evaluation is well established in the purchasing literature. Several evaluation methodologies that consider multiple performance attributes have been proposed for vendor evaluation purposes. While these techniques range from scoring models that utilize prior articulation of weights to derive composite scores for vendors to advanced mathematical models, methods that incorporate the inherent variability in vendor's performance attributes have been limited. The primary reason for the lack of development of such models is due to the complexities associated with stochastic approaches. In order to more accurately evaluate the performance of vendors, it is critical to consider variability in vendor attributes. This paper is an attempt to fill this void in vendor evaluation models by presenting a chance-constrained data envelopment analysis (CCDEA) approach in the presence of multiple performance measures that are uncertain. Our paper effectively demonstrates the first application of CCDEA in the area of purchasing, in general, and vendor evaluation, in particular. The model is demonstrated by applying it to a previously reported dataset from a pharmaceutical company.     

CAUSALITY TESTS OF SHORT SALES ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

Published statistics on short sales of stock are used by investors as a technical indicator of market timing. Research on this topic is mixed. Findings in this article rely on causality tests that use white noise residuals generated from time-series analysis of short sales. Results indicate that specialists' short sales lead short sales of other investors, but these other investors are unable to take advantage of the information because a time lag exists in the published data.