The Intriguing Relation Between Adult Minimum Wage and Child Labour

Because most parents send their children to work when compelled by poverty, one would expect a rise in adult wage to lower child labour. However, if the rise in wage is achieved by a minimum wage law, its impact can be intriguing. It can, for instance, cause some adults to be unemployed and send their children to work, which in turn displaces more adult labour and sends more children to work. The paper solves this process and predicts the incidence of child labour. It shows that, for appropriate parametric configurations, child labour may fall or rise as the adult minimum wage is raised.     

Employment and wage behaviour of industrial enterprises in transition economies: The cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia1

In this paper we use two very large panel datasets from Poland, 1988-90 and Czechoslovakia, 1990-1992 to explore the dynamics of employment and wage determination at the enterprise level in the early years of transition. The study is intended to assist in building a coherent picture of microeconomic adjustment in transition, a field which was not sufficiently explored in the early years of reform. We find that Polish firms were already to some extent responsive to market conditions pre-reform, notably to demand in determining employment. Czechoslovak firms, however, were largely unresponsive to such pressures in 1989-90. The elasticities rose significantly in both countries in the early years of reform, especially in Czechoslovakia which quickly attained initial Polish patterns of adjustment. Firms became much more responsive to sales and cost pressures in adjusting employment and to their own productivity in setting pay. Ownership effects in these early years were, however, much more modest, with state-owned firms adjusting employment more than their private counterparts, perhaps because over-manning was more serious in that sector.     

The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial Incentives and Government Intervention in a Developing Economy

In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision-making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models.     

Oligopsonistic Landlords, Segmented Labor Markets, and the Persistence of Tied-Labor Contracts

This article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty. We show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied-labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring arrangement that guarantees full employment of labor in both seasons. Government intervention in the form of a specific subsidy targeted toward the hiring of permanent laborers may raise the welfare of all laborers while a specific subsidy directed toward the hiring of casual laborers or the institution of relief programs that absorb the rural unemployed in the lean season leads to the casual laborers in the economy being worse off.     

Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed retirement plans?

Since the enactment of Pension Protection Act of 2006, lifecycle funds that reduce exposure to stocks with age have rapidly replaced money market funds as the most commonly nominated default investment options for participant-directed retirement plans. We examine their appropriateness in meeting a threshold level of retirement wealth required by plan participants. Using a utility function motivated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we show that whilst lifecycle funds are vastly superior to money market funds (except for very low thresholds), they rank below balanced funds that maintain constant exposure to equities over time. As thresholds increase, lifecycle funds are also dominated by funds that switch assets conditional to prior investment performance. Even in the absence of a minimum threshold wealth level, lifecycle funds do not emerge as the most preferred choice among the investment options considered by our paper.     

Does competition under Medicare Prospective Payment selectively reduce expenditures on high-cost patients?

Competition and prospective payment have been widely used to control health care costs but may together provide incentives to selectively reduce expenditures on high-cost relative to low-cost patients. We use patient discharge and hospital financial data from California to examine the effects of competition on costs for high- and low-cost admissions in the 12 largest Diagnosis-Related Groups before and after the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). We find that competition increased costs before PPS, but that this effect decreased afterward, especially inpatients with the highest costs.We conclude that competition and PPS selectively reduced spending among the most expensive patients and that careful assessment of these patients' outcomes is important.