Seeking External Evidence to Assess Benefit Transfers for Environmental Policy

The cost and time required to produce original benefit estimates makes benefit transfers a highly valuable component of the process of assessing the benefits and costs of environmental improvements. Because of the great variety of benefit estimates, conducted at different times with different data sources and different techniques, there is concerted effort to understand the validity of transfers. The research in this paper approaches the validity issue of benefit transfers by asking whether there is indirect evidence of the benefits. The premise of the paper is that policies that give significant benefits should induce expected and unexpected behavioral changes. We look for evidence of potential indirect evidence by by estimating the effect of differences air pollutants on activities such as outdoor recreation and work, as found in the American Time Use Survey.     

Reparations for African‐Americans as a Transfer Problem: A Cautionary Tale

We examine how different methods of reparations payments to African‐Americans affect both the black and nonblack populations of the United States using the framework of the transfer‐problem from international trade theory as a theoretical foundation. We find that reparations payments that provide incentives for blacks to use the payment toward purchases of goods and services produced by nonblacks might expand the income gap. Also a reparations payment in the absence of productive capacity owned by blacks is found to have no final positive impact on black income. These results indicate that a reparations payment strategy must be carefully and cautiously conceived in order to achieve the desired effects.     

Games played in a contracting environment

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specific action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distributions over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distributions when all actions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.     

Poverty in US Lesbian and Gay Couple Households

Poverty is a widely researched topic in economics. However, despite growing research on the economic lives of lesbians and gay men in the United States since the mid 1990s, very little is known about poverty in same-sex couple households. This study uses American Community Survey data from 2010 to 2014 to calculate poverty rates for households headed by different-sex versus same-sex couples. Comparing households with similar characteristics, the results show that those headed by same-sex couples are more likely to be in poverty than those headed by different-sex married couples. Despite that overall disadvantage, a decomposition of the poverty risk shows that same-sex couples are protected from poverty by their higher levels of education and labor force participation, and their lower probability of having a child in the home. Lastly, the role of gender – above and beyond sexual orientation – is clear in the greater vulnerability to poverty for lesbian couples.     

Exchange market pressure and primary commodity – exporting emerging markets

This paper studies short-term sensitivity between exchange market pressure and various domestic and external factors in primary commodity-exporting emerging markets. The paper focuses on the top country-commodity groups in sugar, cereal, fuels, ores and coffee during the pre-peak and post-peak commodity price periods across floating and pegged exchange rate regimes, using the price of crude oil as a general benchmark. Employing a panel model and panel VAR analysis, the paper finds the heterogeneity of response patterns unique to country-commodity groups and exchange rate regimes. According to the results, in flexible regimes, volatility occurs via the foreign exchange market, interest rates, and domestic credit cycles, feeding into the social costs for structurally weaker economies. Hard exchange-rate pegs often result in a drain on international reserves as the terms of trade deteriorate following post-price peaks, leading to unpopular depreciation. These results accentuate concerns over uneven international trade patterns, an open economy’s short-term foreign exchange policy, and speculative capital flows. Such sensitivity has broad implications for macroeconomic balance and the sustainability of implied exchange rate targets in the presence of a foreign exchange constraint across emerging markets.     

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive profits; however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes, supplier profits must be zero. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments. While supplier profits cannot be approximated, player action profiles are accessible. Our results also apply to games with costly observation.     

Short Run Constraints and the Increasing Marginal Value of Time in Recreation

Leisure activities such as local recreation trips usually take place in discrete blocks of time that are surrounded by time devoted to other commitments. It can be costly to transfer time between blocks to allow for longer outings. These observations affect the value of time within those blocks and suggest that traditional methods for valuing time using labor markets miss important considerations. This paper presents a new model for time valuation that uses non-employment time commitments to infer the shadow value of time spent in recreation. A unique survey that elicited revealed and stated preference data on household time allocation is used to implement the model. The results support the conclusion that there is an increasing marginal value of time for recreation as the trip length increases.     

On Endogenously Staggered Prices

Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions, they will typically choose to synchronize. This paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering. Our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels—between firms within an industries, and across industries—and produces a continuum of staggered price equilibria. These equilibria are strict, and hence stable under a simple adaptive learning process.