The Effects of Occupational Injuries After Returns to Work: Work Absences and Losses of On-the-Job Productivity

We extend the research on postinjury employment by estimating productivity losses for workers with permanent partial disabilities (PPDs) in the first three years after injury. Our method distinguishes between productivity losses attributed to spells of work absence versus reduced earnings during spells of employment. The method is applied to data for 800 Ontario workers with PPDs. The results document large productivity losses persisting at least three years after injury, with different loss patterns for workers returning to stable versus unstable employment. Human capital investments or job accommodations can reduce productivity losses, but the significant determinants of losses differ for the stable versus unstable employment groups.     

The Effects of Participation and Job-Relevant Information on the Relationship Between Evaluative Style and Job Satisfaction

This study investigates the intervening effects of budgetary participation and job-relevant information on the relationship between budget emphasis and job satisfaction. It proposes that budgetary participation and job-relevant information are endogenous to budget emphasis. Using the path analytical technique and based on a sample of 152 senior managers, the study found that budget emphasis has an insignificant direct effect on job satisfaction, but a strong indirect effect through job-relevant information and budgetary participation. The results also indicate that job-relevant information has an intervening effect on the relationship between participation and job satisfaction.     

Price Cap Regulation in the Cable Television Industry: Why was the Demand Stagnant?

During the period of 1992 to 1996, the cable television industry in the United States was regulated by the FCC, which took several price cap measures. As a result, the increase in the price cable service substantially slowed. However, the cable demand did not rise as anticipated. Using a model of imperfectly discriminating monopoly, the paper empirically investigates this curious phenomenon of stagnant demand despite lower prices. The paper finds that the FCC's price capping constrained both demand and prices. The demand was constrained since the price cap was designed to cover almost all TV channels carried by cable systems, and subsequently discouraged cable systems from meeting different customer preferences with multi-tier services.     

Multiple Imputation in Multivariate Problems When the Imputation and Analysis Models Differ

Bayesian multiple imputation (MI) has become a highly useful paradigm for handling missing values in many settings. In this paper, I compare Bayesian MI with other methods – maximum likelihood, in particular—and point out some of its unique features. One key aspect of MI, the separation of the imputation phase from the analysis phase, can be advantageous in settings where the models underlying the two phases do not agree.     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

Developing a cost-benefit analysis process for small-to-moderate expenditure decisions

During the Reagan administration, the federal government mandated the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) for regulatory decisions involving $100 million or more. While the use of CBAs has increased, less attention has been given to CBA processes involving smaller expenditures (regulatory and nonregulatory). As the federal budget tightens in the years ahead, the need to make hard decisions about these policies, programs, and technologies will increase. This paper describes a CBA process developed for the Office of Strategic Planning of the Social Security Administration; it was designed to handle small-to-moderate expenditure decisions (or for preliminary estimates of larger undertakings). A sample CBA using this process is provided, along with a discussion of the lessons that were learned from an initial application.