Leave it in the ground? Oil sands development under carbon pricing

We evaluate the impact of internalizing the carbon emissions externality on new oil sands projects. Using data from recent oil sands projects and estimates of both the social costs of carbon and carbon prices consistent with meeting global climate change targets, we estimate the potential impact of action on climate change on the economic viability of oil sands investments. Our results indicate that oil sands are a marginal resource before they incur any carbon costs. Incorporating carbon costs, we find that the viability of oil sands depends on the coverage of carbon pricing across the life cycle emissions from oil sands and on the equilibrium incidence of carbon prices on producers. We show an important interaction between resource royalties and carbon charges that implies that the impact carbon pricing depends on not only the stringency and coverage of the carbon price but also its point of application of a carbon price. Finally, we explore the potential for technological change to mitigate the impacts of carbon pricing on oil sands investment viability.     

Growth forecast errors and government investment and consumption multipliers

We compare government investment and consumption multipliers in developed economies during the initial years of the ongoing fiscal consolidation. We find that, in countries with high public debt, the investment multiplier is likely to be higher than what has been assumed by policy-makers and higher than the consumption multiplier. This leads to the conclusion that the consolidation should be accompanied by increased public investment.     

Does God practice a random walk? The 'financial physics' of a nineteenth-century forerunner,Jules Regnault

We analyse the work of a neglected French economist, Jules Regnault, whose Calcul des Chances et Philosophie de la Bourse (1863) laid the basis of modern stochastic models of price behaviour and contains an anticipation of econometrics. At a time when short-term speculation was denounced as immoral, he approached this question ‘scientifically’ and constructed two models. The first one was relative to short-term speculation and took the shape of a random walk - a model used by Bachelier (1900). The second one deals with long-term speculation and aims at evaluating the mean value of the French 3 per cent bond.     

Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does The World Have A Middle Class?

Using the national income/expenditure distribution data from 111 countries, we decompose total inequality between the individuals in the world, by continents and regions. We use Yitzhaki's Gini decomposition which allows for an exact breakdown of the Gini. We find that Asia is the most heterogeneous continent; between-country inequality is much more important than inequality in incomes within countries. At the other extreme is Latin America where differences between the countries are small, but inequalities within the countries are large. Western Europe/North America is fairly homogeneous both in terms of countries' mean incomes and income differences between individuals. If we divide the world population into three groups: the rich (those with incomes greater than Italy's mean income), the poor (those with incomes less than Western countries' poverty line), and the middle class, we find that there are only 11 percent of people who are "world middle class"; 78 percent are poor, and 11 percent are rich.     

THE GINI-TYPE FUNCTIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE DERIVATION

The purpose of this note is to propose an alternative and intuitively simpler derivation of the Gini coefficient (in Section l), to show how it can be generalized and how then a number of coefficients (concentration coefficient, Kakwani's progressivity index) are obtained directly from this generalization (Section 2), and finally to use this approach to obtain some Gini relationships (Section 3).     

AN ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE INCOME AND INEQUALITY IN BYZANTIUM AROUND YEAR 1000

Using recent economic statistics from the peak period of Byzantine political and economic influence, we estimate the average income around the year 1000 to have been about 6 nomismata per capita per annum. This is then translated into current prices using two independent methods. They both yield an estimate around $PPP 640–680 in 1990 international prices. It is argued that this amount is some 20 percent below an average estimate of Roman incomes at the time of Augustus (around year one). Assuming that most of income differences in Byzantium were due to the differences in average incomes between social classes, we estimate the Gini coefficient to have been in the range between 40 and 45.     

When should firms invest in old capital?

The present paper analyzes optimal investment policies when the production function depends on capital of various vintages. In such an environment it is natural to ask whether the firm will invest in old-vintage capital at all. Other studies do not tell us when investment in old capital will take place. In the present paper I derive such a condition. Predictably, investment in old capital takes place if the elasticity of substitution between old and new capital is low, and when the depreciation of capital is high. However, other parameters such as the rates of technological progress and depreciation matter as well.     

Changes in the Perception of the Poverty Line During the Depression in Russia, 1993-96

Economic transition in Russia was accompanied by a precipitousdecline in real income for most of the population. This articleanalyzes how the decline affected people's perception of theminimum level of income needed to make ends meet. Individual-leveldata collected from repeated surveys between March 1993 andSeptember 1996 reveal that the elasticity of subjective minimumincome with respect to actual median income was 1.5 or thatpeople's subjective estimate of the minimum income for an adultRussian fell about 1.7 percent each month. This sharp reductionin the face of a decrease in real income meant that the percentageof the population who felt that they were poor declined, eventhough poverty remained at a very high level (more than 60 percentof the population) throughout the period. This self-perceptionis in marked contrast to an "objective " measure of poverty:the percentage of the population whose income was less thana given real poverty line rose.     

Wage Differentials between the State and Private Sectors in Moscow

In this study the 1997 Russian Labor Force Survey is used to investigate wage differentials between the state and the private sector in the city of Moscow. Our analysis demonstrates that substantial differences exist between private and state sector wages. We estimate the gap between private and state sector wages to be 14.3 percent for men and 18.3 percent for women. We also find gender differences in wages. Men in the private sector earn on average 23.7 percent more than women. The gender wage gap in the state sector is even higher at 32.5 percent. In the state sector, wages for both men and women increase as years of tenure increase. But in the private sector this is only true for men; women earn no return to tenure. The probability of employment in the private sector decreases with age and tenure.