Option volume and volatility response to scheduled economic news releases

In this article, we examine the impact of 21 different types of scheduled macroeconomic news announcements on S&P 100 stock‐index option volume and implied volatility. We find that there is a 2‐h delay after the announcement before volume increases. However, there is an immediate increase in volatility, which slowly dissipates over several hours. Further analysis shows that most of the high volume and volatility after announcements come from the announcements that are considered bad news. That is, bad news creates high volatility and high volume, whereas good news elicits lower volume and is not associated with higher volatility. These results are not consistent with the predictions of any one model. We also find that the announcements that cause the largest reaction in the equity option market are Consumer Credit, Consumer Spending, Factory Inventories, NAPM, and Non‐Farm Payrolls. Six other announcements elicit a mild response. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:315–345, 2003     

The design and pricing of fixed‐ and moving‐window contracts: An application of Asian‐Basket option pricing methods to the hog‐finishing sector

Asian‐Basket‐type moving‐window contracts are an increasingly used risk‐management tool in the North American hog sector. The moving‐window contract is decomposed into a portfolio of a long Asian‐Basket put and a short Asian‐Basket call option. A projected break‐even price is used to determine the floor price, and then Monte Carlo simulation methods are used to price both a moving‐ and a fixed‐window contract. These methods provide unbiased pricing of fixed‐ and moving‐window hog‐finishing contracts of 1‐year duration. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:1047–1073, 2003     

Speculative attack against the Hungarian forint

In mid-January 2003 a severe speculative attack was launched against the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint. The attack was very unusual in the history of foreign exchange speculations, since it was aimed at enforcing the appreciation — and not the depreciation — of the currency targeted. The specific nature of this kind of speculation is closely related to Hungary’s accession to the European Union in general and to EMU in particular. Since the other Central and Eastern European acceding countries face similar problems and challenges, the Hungarian experience may involve some instructive lessons on monetary and economic policy for them too.