Modelling the Risks Associated with the Increased Importation of Fresh Produce from Emerging Supply Sources Outside the EU to the UK

The risk of non‐indigenous plant pests entering the UK via international trade in fresh produce is increasing. The objective of this article is to identify existing and emerging supply sources for UK fresh produce importers and examine the extent to which they could provide invasion pathways. We tested the hypothesis that increased imports of fresh produce from new sources outside the European Union could increase the risks of non‐indigenous insect pests. We use a bio‐economic model approach in which the number of species arrivals is a function of the volume of imports, whereas the volume of imports itself is a function of gross domestic product, relative import prices and seasonality. The study has identified clear trends, which show import volumes of fresh produce and species detections increasing from new supply sources. If this trend continues in the future, then the UK inspection agency should expect to confront species from new suppliers in much greater numbers, given that import volumes of fresh produce are income elastic.     

2013 Nobel Prize Revisited: Do Shiller's Models Really Have Predictive Power?

The authors take a critical view of the investment approach advocated by recent Nobel laureate Robert Shiller. A critic of efficient markets theory, Shiller has proposed that investors, when attempting to determine whether the S&P Index is under‐ or overvalued, should use a P/E ratio whose denominator is the 120‐month moving average of the company's EPS. But the authors find that such an approach does not provide consistently superior insights to those provided by conventional PEs—and that, for example, the use of both conventional and Shiller PE multiples would have indicated a highly overvalued S&P not only in early 2000—before the bursting of the dotcom bubble—but also in 1996, when Fed Governor Greenspan spoke prematurely of “irrational exuberance.” The authors also show that both the Shiller PE and the conventional PE ratios fail a critical statistical test: they are not mean‐reverting—and as a consequence, both ratios can be expected to indicate either undervaluation or overvaluation for very long periods of time. Complicating matters, current earnings are useful to investors in predicting future stock prices only insofar as they provide a reliable guide to future earnings and cash flows. And as one would expect in competitive capital markets, even perfect foreknowledge of future earnings is not likely to be much help since, according to the authors' analysis, five‐year earnings explain on average less than 20% of the variation in prices over consecutive five‐year periods.     

Secured debt and managerial incentives

Financial theory holds that firms can control agency costs through the use of short-term and secured debt. We examine the relation between the use of secured debt and the incentive of the manager to increase the risk of the firm, as measured by vega. We find that firms utilize secured debt to a lesser extent when managerial volatility sensitivity is higher. Our results suggest that these same firms employ short-term debt as the primary tool to control risk-shifting. Managers with a high risk appetite avoid secured debt, but appear to do so without compromising the interests of the shareholders.     

The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multiagent perspective

Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“I just like the stock”: The role of Reddit sentiment in the GameStop share rally

This paper investigates the role played by the social media platform Reddit in the events around the GameStop (GME) share rally in early 2021. In particular, we analyze the impact of discussions on the r/WallStreetBets subreddit on the price dynamics of the American online retailer GameStop. We customize a sentiment analysis dictionary for Reddit platform users based on the Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner (VADER) sentiment analysis package and perform textual analysis on 10.8 million comments. The analysis of the relationships between Reddit sentiments and 1-, 5-, 10-, and 30-min GameStop returns contribute to the growing body of literature on “meme stocks” and the impact of discussions on investment forums on intraday stock price movements.     

External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

R esearch summary : Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. M anagerial summary : Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers “cooking the books” in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Construct measurement in strategic management research: illusion or reality?

Strategic management research has been characterized as placing less emphasis on construct measurement than other management subfields. In this work, we document the state of the art of measurement in strategic management research, and discuss the implications for interpreting the results of research in this field. To assess the breadth of measurement issues in the discipline, we conducted a content analysis of empirical strategic management articles published in leading journals in the period of 1998–2000. We found that few studies discuss reliability and validity issues, and empirical research in the field commonly relies on single‐indicator measures. Additionally, studies rarely address the problems of attenuation due to measurement error. We close with a discussion of the implications for future research and for interpreting prior work in strategic management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How advanced is the strategy paradigm? The role of particularism and universalism in shaping research outcomes

As the field of strategy reaches its 25th anniversary, we examine how far the field has progressed during that time. Both management and strategy research have been characterized as being in an early stage of development. We draw on Kuhn's ( 1996 ) paradigm development model, which posits a connection between a field's stage of maturity and research processes and outcomes, to assess the maturity of the strategy field. We conduct two studies. The first is a cross‐discipline comparison of productivity norms for university faculty. The second study examines longitudinal research outcomes for a sample of 945 strategy faculty. Our results indicate that strategy has the attributes of both an early stage and mature field: while overall research norms are low relative to other fields, they are driven far more by merit‐based than non‐merit factors. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.