The evaluation stage in marketing decision making

Prior to making important decisions, marketing managers go through an evaluation process in which available alternatives are compared. Yet, no systematic discussion of the evaluation process exists in the marketing literature. This article reviews the marketing and behavioral decision theory literature in order to identify factors that may cause errors in the two fundamental elements of the evaluation process—the estimation of probabilities and the determination of the value of outcomes. Propositions are developed that specify circumstances in which marketing management decisions may be influenced by judgmental biases, and procedures are identified for debiasing such judgments.     

DETERMINANTS OF GOODWILL AMORTIZATION PERIOD

This study investigates whether economic consequences have an effect on the length of the period over which goodwill is amortized. It finds that there is a significant relationship between the size of the firm and the length of the amortization period. It also finds, when the only firms included in the sample are those reporting debt covenant restrictions dependent in part on goodwill accounting, evidence that the length of the amortization period for goodwill is related to the firm's leverage.     

Competition and structural change in Eastern Europe

Widely publicized reform programs for East Europe which emphasize rapid privatization are questioned on the grounds that structural changes to assure workable competition take precedence and will take years. A mix of deconcentrated state, cooperative, worker-owned, private, and foreignowned business can be workable. Import competition and antitrust legislation have auxiliary roles.     

CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.     

Cointegration Vector Estimation by Panel DOLS and Long‐run Money Demand*

We study the panel dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) estimator of a homogeneous cointegration vector for a balanced panel of N individuals observed over T time periods. Allowable heterogeneity across individuals include individual‐specific time trends, individual‐specific fixed effects and time‐specific effects. The estimator is fully parametric, computationally convenient, and more precise than the single equation estimator. For fixed N as T→∞, the estimator converges to a function of Brownian motions and the Wald statistic for testing a set of s linear constraints has a limiting χ²(s) distribution. The estimator also has a Gaussian sequential limit distribution that is obtained first by letting T→∞ and then letting N→∞. In a series of Monte‐Carlo experiments, we find that the asymptotic distribution theory provides a reasonably close approximation to the exact finite sample distribution. We use panel DOLS to estimate coefficients of the long‐run money demand function from a panel of 19 countries with annual observations that span from 1957 to 1996. The estimated income elasticity is 1.08 (asymptotic s.e. = 0.26) and the estimated interest rate semi‐elasticity is ?0.02 (asymptotic s.e. = 0.01).     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.