Rapid housing privatization in reforming economies: Pay the special dividend now

State ownership and operation of the housing stock in the previously centrally planned economies severely distorts housing markets, stifles labor mobility, and produces operating losses that exacerbate fiscal deficits. The conventional wisdom regarding structural reform is to gradually increase administered rents, thereby reducing deficits. Housing sales, where they occur, are primarily motivated to generate revenue to cover deficits in current operating budgets. We argue that the perceived benefits to a prolonged transition are illusory and the social costs are high.Housing will be affordable only if the population's current ownership of the existing housing stock is recognized and dividends on it are paid out. The payment can be a regular dividend (e.g., housing allowances) or a one-time special dividend (e.g., ownership vouchers). The latter is preferable.     

The Canadian Keiretsu

This article describes the Canadian keiretsu , in which a main Chartered Bank dominates an interlocking group of corporate clients, investment dealers, trust companies, and professional advisors. Such a network facilitates information-sharing and monitoring among group members, while also reducing the agency costs of banker misbehavior. Most major Canadian firms are members of a keiretsu , and stock ownership of Canadian corporations is far more concentrated than ownership of U.S. companies.
Given their many similarities of history, law, and geography, Canada and the United States should have ended up with similar corporate ownership and governance structures. But they did not, and the difference was Canada's less restrictive banking and bankruptcy laws, which in turn can be traced to Canada's distinctly non-populist historical experience.
The Canadian keiretsu arose primarily for two reasons: (1) the larger concentration of commercial banking (the six largest Canadian banks today account for 98% of the industry's assets) allowed by Canadian law; and (2) the greater powers of Canadian secured lenders in the event of default. Unlike a U.S. Chapter 11 filing, in a Canadian bankruptcy the lender's right to assume control of the assets was not stayed until quite recently. And, even with the recent change in Canadian bankruptcy law, Canadian secured lenders have much stronger protection of their claims in bankruptcy than their U.S. counterparts in Chapter 11.     

Housing privatization in Romania

Over the past three decades, Romanian housing rights changed from a strictly managed public stock to one governed by individual decision‐making. And while it is typical that widespread private ownership provides a basis for a well‐functioning housing market, in Romania this has not been the case. Indeed, rather than creating a market that spontaneously allocates resources efficiently, housing privatization in Romania has created exclusion rights, thus creating an Anti‐commons problem. This problem can have effects similar to those of the tragedy of the Commons in which those who share a common good overuse it. In the Anti‐commons, in contrast, if too many owners have the right to exclude others from use of a resource, the resource is underused. In both cases, the rights allocation wastes resources.     

Rater Rating‐Level Bias and Accuracy in Performance Appraisals: The Impact OF Rater Personality,Performance Management Competence,and Rater Accountability

We studied the problem of rating‐level bias and rating accuracy among retail managers of a Fortune 500 retailer. Hypotheses were tested regarding the relationship among managers’ Five‐Factor Model (FFM) personality characteristics, their competence in performance management, and their levels of bias and accuracy in appraisals made in situations differing on levels of rater accountability. Associate store managers (N = 125) rated subordinates, peers and managers under conditions of high and low rater accountability. We found support for the stability of rating‐level bias across rating situations. Raters’ levels of agreeableness and assertiveness were related to mean rating levels across situations, and U‐shaped relationships were found in predicting one measure of rating accuracy such that high and low levels of these two traits were related to greater rating inaccuracy. Conscientiousness scores were significantly (and negatively) correlated with highly accountable mean ratings of subordinates. Performance management competence was related to rating‐level bias in both high‐ and low‐accountability conditions and contributed incremental validity in the prediction of rating level and rating accuracy. Our results indicate that the most lenient raters are more agreeable, less assertive, and less competent in performance management. These raters may also be less accurate. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Role of China in the Global Strategy of Multinational Enterprises

This paper moves from the general to the particular. First, it examines the differential speed of globalization in different types of market – specifically markets in finance, goods and services, and finally labour markets. It then analyses the location and ownership strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs), both as regards individual national markets and then in terms of the interaction between national markets (the ‘local/global’ spectrum). This analytical framework is applied to the place of China in the global strategy of MNEs. This application illuminates the role of DFI (direct foreign investment) in China and illustrates the peculiarities of China's place in the global system. The distortions in China's domestic system interact with the global strategies of MNEs to produce several interesting results, including: (1) the importance of MNEs’ ownership strategy; (2) non-optimal location decisions; (3) the ‘excessive internalization’ of activities in China; and (4) the growing importance of China as a location for DFI and, in future, the potential for growth of outward DFI from China.     

The Economics of Business Process Design: Motivation,Information and Coordination Within the Firm

This paper presents a transaction cost analysis of the internal business processes of firms. Business processes are collections of activities which are technologically or managerially linked so that they jointly affect value added. Their organisation is characterised by their ‘architecture’—the allocation of responsibilities amongst individuals and groups and communication between them for information and coordination—and their incentive structure. The overall costs of organisation are determined by losses due to imperfect motivation of process members, which flows from the incentive structure, and imperfect information and coordination, which flow from the architecture, together with the resource costs associated with incentives and architecture. Perfect motivation corresponds to ‘team behaviour’ and a quantitative model, based on team theory, indicates how the best architecture depends on the degree interaction between activities comprising the business process.     

Some Guidelines for Acquisitions

Since its introduction by Dworkin and Grimlund (1984), the moment bound has emerged as a less conservative method of evaluating monetary-unit samples than existing methods for estimating the total error amount in substantive auditing. Arthur Andersen has recently adopted it in place of the Stringer bound (Felix et al., 1990). In this paper we examine its performance with unrestricted random, cell and sieve sampling; the behaviour of the sampling methods is compared by means of an empirical investigation using two new accounting populations. Our results show that the method of sample selection has no effect on the tightness of the moment bound, but does appear to affect the reliability and precision. While the moment bound is reliable in most cases, some reliability problems arise and these are most frequent with unrestricted random sampling. We also observe substantial gains in the precision of the moment bound with cell and sieve sampling in populations with large line items. The reduction in sample size resulting from these gains is demonstrated using the design effect (Kish, 1965).