排序方式: 共有57条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow
one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process,
fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects’ performances depend
on their opponents’ learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage
in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms
are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. 相似文献
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Maik T. Schneider Burkhard Schade Hariolf Grupp 《Technology Analysis & Strategic Management》2004,16(2):147-172
Many car manufacturers recognize fuel cell vehicles as future substitutes for conventional cars with internal combustion engines. According to press releases and brochures, different strategic approaches of the automobile companies to fuel cell technology can be identified. These strategies match to a high degree the market entry strategies known from strategic marketing literature. A system dynamics model that reflects the beginning innovation process and the strategic approaches of a pioneer (first to market), an early follower (early to market) and a late follower (late to market) has been built. It examines the future prospects of the car manufacturers' strategies in three different scenarios, which illuminate possible future developments of external influences like politics or fuel infrastructure. 相似文献
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The effects of option trading at the DTB on the variance of the underlying stocks are examined. We use a new distribution free test being based on the empirical distribution functions. The evidence indicates that stock return variance increased after the introduction of the DTB. This effect can be partly explained by the strong increase in trading volume for option listed stocks. Our results stand in stark contrast to prior studies of both American and European financial markets. 相似文献
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Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz et al. (Games Econ Behav 77:100–121, 2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents’ awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness. 相似文献
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Burkhard Heer 《Review of Income and Wealth》2002,48(3):371-394
The effects of the German unemployment compensation system on aggregate savings and the distribution of wealth are studied in a general equilibrium 60–period OLG model. The distribution of wealth is derived as an endogenous function of the parameters characterizing the unemployment compensation system, which comprises unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and welfare payments (Sozialhilfe), the latter two being subject to a means test. As our main results: (i) both aggregate savings and wealth equality are a monotone decreasing function of unemployment benefits; (ii) optimal unemployment compensation declines over the spell of unemployment; (iii) asset–based means tests are shown to reduce welfare if the allowable wealth level is below the average wealth in the economy. 相似文献
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It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard
models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the
observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite
(continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability
in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model). 相似文献
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Paul M. Vaaler Burkhard N. Schrage Steven A. Block 《Review of Development Economics》2006,10(1):154-170
We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world. 相似文献