New Products and Financial Risk Changes

The historic focus of new products research has been on the ability of new products to enhance the profitability and competitive position of the innovating firm. In this article, Timothy Devinney shows that there exists an overlooked and potentially significant side effect associated with new product innovations: financial risk changes. He reports that significant financial risk changes occurred in approximately 50% of the new product announcements he examined. The magnitude of these financial risk changes translates into overestimates or underestimates of the firm's cost of capital by 17% to 18% and is strongly and positively related to the size of the firm and the firm's new product innovation activity.     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

Financing budget deficits in the Netherlands

Summary In The Netherlands public debt management is in the hands of the budgetary policy-maker, whose recourse to the capital market can exceed or fall short of the total borrowing requirement in order to absorb or create liquidity. The conduct of that policy since the early 1960's is analyzed in this paper, emphasizing the importance of medium-term control over the public finances as a prerequisite for the ability of debt management to make a flexible contribution to monetary policy. During the 1960's this condition was satisfied and debt management followed a stable countercyclical pattern which, however, was abandoned after the early 1970's as the public finances swung into substantial disequilibrium.The author thanks J. Boughton, L. Bovenberg, D. Hendry, P. Masson, J. Muellbauer, and the referees for comments on earlier versions. However, the views expressed are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71