OPTIMAL CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE PRESENCE OF INCOME TAXATION*

A substantial literature examines how the Pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. Additional literature considers distributive concerns. It is demonstrated, however, that simple first‐best rules—unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution—are correct in the model examined. Specifically, setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms (and subsidies equal to marginal benefits) can generate a Pareto improvement, as can a marginal reform toward the first‐best. Qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented.     

A ONE‐SECTOR GROWTH MODEL WITH CONSUMPTION STANDARD: INDETERMINATE OR DETERMINATE?

In a representative agent, one-sector growth model in which the discounting is decreasing in the consumption standard measured as the current average consumption flow, Drugeon (1998) establishes local indeterminacy. This paper extends Drugeon's setup in the discount rate. In our setup, the consumption standard is a habit stock that a weighted average of the whole history of average consumption flows in the past. Local indeterminacy emerges only when the speed of habit formation tends to infinity; otherwise, local indeterminacy cannot appear, no matter how large the habit affects the discount rate.     

THE LEAD–LAG RELATION BETWEEN THE S&P500 SPOT AND FUTURES MARKETS: AN INTRADAY-DATA ANALYSIS USING A THRESHOLD REGRESSION MODEL

In this paper we examine the lead–lag interaction between the futures and spot markets of the S&P500 using the threshold regression model on intraday data. The use of threshold variables to model the changes in the regression structure with respect to different market conditions enables us to investigate the lead–lag interaction in a data-based approach and avoid stratifying the data arbitrarily. Using the basis as the threshold variable, we find that the short-selling restrictions in the spot market reduce the effect of the spot index as the leading variable. To study the effect of market-wide information on the interaction between the spot and futures markets, we use the coefficient of determination in the regression of the S&P500 on the Morgan–Stanley Composite Index-US and the Major Market Index as the threshold variable. We find that the lead effect of the futures market over the spot market is stronger when there is more market-wide information. On the other hand, the lead effect of the cash market over the futures market is weaker when there is more market-wide information. In addition, we also use the lagged 45-min return of the spot market as the threshold variable. We find that the lead effect of the spot market is stronger in periods of directionless trading than in periods of good or bad markets.     

Explaining Collective Intentionality

A BSTRACT . The Construction of Social Reality contains interesting suggestions about the ways in which phenomena of we-intentionality derive from beliefs and desires of social agents. This explanatory trust is in deep tension with Searle's general view that we-intentionality is a primitive phenomenon. I propose that we preserve the explanations and reject the general view, and argue for the proposal.     

Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns

There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a $${\$}25$$  billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while ensuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on the mechanism described in this paper was implemented by Yahoo! Inc.     

Market Uncertainty and Socially Embedded Reputation

Both economists and sociologists generally recognize the importance of reputation in coordinating economic transactions. In a perfectly competitive and anonymous market characterized by faceless buyers and sellers, the issue of reputation would be irrelevant and unnecessary. In reality, however, markets are often filled with varying degrees of information asymmetry, which can threaten the very existence of the market system itself. In critical reaction to the standard neoclassical model, some economists, on the one hand, argue that when there is an information problem, reputation serves as a valuable source of market signal of quality. Sociologists of economic life similarly contend that reputation, along with trust, is critical in lowering transaction costs and thereby facilitating various economic activities among individual actors. The purpose of this article is to apply this broad theoretical observation to a specific empirical phenomenon. It does so by highlighting the role of social networks that connect actors on both demand and supply sides of the market. Specifically, this study examines how interpersonal networks in the market for legal services affect the duration of ties between buyers and sellers. Quantitative analysis based on a random sample of Chicago lawyers, a project funded by the American Bar Foundation, reveals that ceteris paribus the lawyer-client relations are significantly driven by social network factors.     

Henry George Under the Microscope: Comments on "Henry George's Political Critics"

The annual supplement of the AJES for 2008 titled Henry George: Political Ideologue, Social Philosopher, and Economic Theorist had as its first and longest essay "Henry George's Political Critics" by Professor Michael Hudson. It offered a multitude of criticisms, most of which Prof. Hudson seemed to agree with. All purported to be criticisms of George as a political strategist, though some seem more to originate from Hudson's disagreement with theoretical positions George was bound to take. The purpose of this short paper is to show that Professor Hudson's long article fails to do what it seems intended to do. That is, it fails to show that trade unionists and especially socialists were "natural allies" of the Georgist movement, that it was George's fault that that they were not, and that George "allied" his movement irrevocably to "capital," rejecting its "natural allies."