Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

Identifying fiscal policy (in)effectiveness from the differential counter‐cyclicality of government spending in the interwar period

Differences across decades in the counter‐cyclical stance of fiscal policy can identify whether the growth in government spending affects output growth and so speeds recovery from a recession. We study government‐spending reaction functions from the 1920s and 1930s for twenty countries. There are two main findings. First, surprisingly, government spending was less counter‐cyclical in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Second, the growth of government spending did not have a significant effect on output growth, so that there is little evidence that this feature of fiscal policy played a stabilizing role in the interwar period.     

Differences in the degree of unionization as a source of comparative advantage in open economies

This paper considers two integrated countries that differ only in their labour markets: one country hosts unions, whereas the other one pays competitive wages. These institutional differences are a source of comparative advantage, which crucially impact inter‐industry trade and welfare in the open economy. In this setting, deunionization exerts opposing welfare effects in the two economies. Increasing product market competition is beneficial for the unionized country and detrimental for its trading partner. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong support for the main hypotheses of our theoretical model.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

Firm‐Level Evidence for the Language Investment Effect on SME Exporters

Both analysis of international trade and the knowledge resource theory of the firm imply that language skills should play a vital role in exporting. This may be apparent to large multinationals with sites in many different linguistic locations, but we show it is less obvious to smaller companies. With data on the language used by each of a large sample of European small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises in their export markets, we test and estimate the effects of language assets on language performance in export markets and on export sales. Controlling for the possibility that language skills may be acquired by exporting, we find a very substantial export return to linguistic expertise, indicative of unexploited gains from investment in languages. There is also evidence of greater under‐investment in language skills in English‐speaking Europe.     

An Experimental Study on Dividing Gains through Politics

This article offers experimental evidence to examine an important case in politics where a monopolistic proposer seeks a majority's consent from competitive responders to split the gain. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the side of trade with a monopoly will exploit the side of trade with competition to reap almost all of the gain. Our experimental evidence reveals that while responders do compete with each other to race to the bottom (consistent with the prediction), the monopolistic proposer settles down to offer a ‘fair’ share of the pie to those from whom he or she seeks majority support (contrary to the prediction).     

Interest Rates and Credit Risk

This paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default in the context of a dynamic model in which the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival. The need to finance new investment pushes firms' leverage ratio above some state‐contingent target toward which firms gradually adjust through earnings retention. The response to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms. Our results help rationalize some of the evidence regarding the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy.     

Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.     

Fundamentals and Exchange Rate Prediction Revisited

This paper measures latent fundamental exchange rates with independent component‐based rates constructed from a cross‐section of exchange rates and then uses their deviations from exchange rates to forecast. Empirical results indicate that the independent component‐based model and its Taylor rule and purchasing power parity augmented models are superior to the random walk in predicting exchange rates. These results are robust to several scenarios and are likely to be observed if the U.S. sources and the recursive scheme are applied. Our results reveal that information regarding the third moment of exchange rate changes is helpful to explain exchange rate movements.