Asset-pricing Puzzles and Incomplete Markets

The representative agent theory of asset pricing is modified to incorporate heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. The model features two types of agents who differ up to a nontradable, idiosyncratic component in their endowment processes. Numerical solutions indicate that individuals are able to diversify a substantial portion of their idiosyncratic income risk through riskless borrowing and lending alone. Restrictions on the variability of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution ( Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) ) are used to argue that incomplete markets, as modeled here, cannot account for the properties of asset returns that are anomalous from the perspective of representative agent theory.     

Do Consumers Care about Ethics? Willingness to Pay for Fair‐Trade Coffee

Consumers’ buying behavior is not consistent with their positive attitude toward ethical products. In a survey of 808 Belgian respondents, the actual willingness to pay for fair‐trade coffee was measured. It was found that the average price premium that the consumers were willing to pay for a fair‐trade label was 10%. Ten percent of the sample was prepared to pay the current price premium of 27% in Belgium. Fair‐trade lovers (11%) were more idealistic, aged between 31 and 44 years and less “conventional.” Fair‐trade likers (40%) were more idealistic but sociodemographically not significantly different from the average consumer.     

Can Affine Term Structure Models Help Us Predict Exchange Rates?

This paper proposes an arbitrage-free model to extract the information that the term structure of forward premia contains for forecasting future spot exchange rates. Using monthly data on four U.S. dollar bilateral exchange rates, we find evidence that this model provides statistically better forecasts than those produced by a random walk for the British pound and Canadian dollar exchange rates. Negative results for the German mark/Euro and Swiss franc are explained by a rejection of the restrictions imposed by the term structure model.     

In Defense of Usury Laws

Usury law is often criticized by economists for curtailing lending and thus creating deadweight costs. This paper shows that if moral hazard leads to credit rationing, a just-binding usury law creates a deadweight gain.  This property also holds in most market-clearing equilibria. Independent of social insurance benefits, or curbing present-biased preferences, interest rate caps have merit.     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.