Do Immigrants Affect Firm‐Specific Wages?*

We propose and test a novel effect of immigration on wages. Existing studies have focused on the wage effects that result from changes in the aggregate labour supply in a competitive labour market. We argue that if labour markets are not fully competitive, immigrants might also affect wage formation at the most disaggregate level – the workplace. Using linked employer?employee data, we find that an increased use of low‐skilled immigrant workers has a significantly negative effect on the wages of native workers at the workplace – also when controlling for potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using both fixed effects and instrumental variables.     

How Productive Is Workplace Health and Safety?

In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of workplace health and safety practices on firm performance, using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data merged with unique cross‐sectional representative firm survey data on work environment conditions. We estimate standard production functions, augmented with workplace environment indicators, addressing both time‐invariant and time‐varying potentially relevant unobservables in the production process. We find positive and large productivity effects of improved physical dimensions of the health and safety environment, specifically, “internal climate” and “monotonous repetitive work”.     

CAN SECRET INTERVENTION BE COMPATIBLE WITH A NON‐PROFITMAKING CENTRAL BANK AND A FUNDAMENTAL‐CONSISTENT TARGET?

The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39)