On the stability of the Klein-I model

This paper presents a revision of the numerical results by Theil and Boot (1962) on the asymptotic standard errors of characteristic roots in the Klein-I model.     

Constrained Indirect Estimation

We develop generalized indirect estimation procedures that handle equality and inequality constraints on the auxiliary model parameters by extracting information from the relevant multipliers, and compare their asymptotic efficiency to maximum likelihood. We also show that, regardless of the validity of the restrictions, the asymptotic efficiency of such estimators can never decrease by explicitly considering the multipliers associated with additional equality constraints. Furthermore, we discuss the variety of effects on efficiency that can result from imposing constraints on a previously unrestricted model. As an example, we consider a stochastic volatility process estimated through a garch model with Gaussian or  t  distributed errors.     

Antithetic variates to estimate the simulation bias in non-linear models

This paper describes a Monte Carlo experiment, which makes use of antithetic variate sampling, to get an accurate estimate of the deterministic simulation bias in the non-linear Klein—Goldberger model. The computational efficiency is more than 500 times greater than in case of simple random sampling.     

Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade

We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.     

On the anti-competitive effects of quantity discounts

We analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that for a sizeable set of parameter values, quantity discounts harm the smaller firm and reduce consumers' surplus. They can even decrease social welfare, i.e. the sum of producers' and consumers' surpluses. However, the circumstances in which quantity discounts may decrease social welfare are limited and difficult to identify in practice.     

Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a "National Champion"

We analyze the design of optimal regulation of a domestic monopolist that also competes in an unregulated foreign market. We show how foreign activities affect regulation, consumers' surplus, national welfare, and firm's profits. Although expansion in unregulated foreign markets amplifies the distortions that are caused by the regulator's limited information, we also show that allowing the firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers. We analyze if and when the firm's decision to expand abroad coincides with national interests.     

A Monte Carlo approach to compute the asymptotic standard errors of dynamic multipliers

A Monte Carlo method to compute asymptotic standard errors of dynamic multipliers is proposed. It is applied to Hein's Model I to find standard error of interim multipliers of taxes on nominal income.     

Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises*

Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. I analyze a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross‐subsidize, the country with a larger stake in the firm's profit, and the linkage among national regulations may induce unexpected effects on outputs. I also analyze a multinational's lobbying decisions and its effects on national regulations. Finally, a credible threat to “fly” away from tough regulators lets the firm obtain larger profits.     

Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?

Review of Industrial Organization - Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those...     

Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation*

This paper examines the equivalence among price‐modifying and quantity‐fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well‐known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open‐loop and closed‐loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff‐quota equivalence holds, while, in general, it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy (weakly) prefers a quantity‐equivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff. These results are not a consequence of the equilibrium concept we adopt (with and without market power), but directly follow from the interplay between market power and the properties of accumulation dynamics.