The Role of Comprehensive Income as Financial Performance Predictor： Panel Evidence From Italy

The aim of this study is to investigate whether the comprehensive income （CI） and its individual components are useful in assessing the future cash flows for Italian listed companies. In addition, we verify whether the recent requirement of International Accounting Standard （IAS） 1 （r2011） of providing the other comprehensive income （OCI） separates in two sub-totals （recycling and non-recycling items groups） is useful to explain the expected cash flows. We consider a sample of 121 Italian non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange for the testing period of 2008-2011, employing a fixed-effect regression model, and we test the relationship between the changes in the variables considered and not the relative absolute value reducing, in this way, the risk of not grasping a report if the independent variable and the response variable do not have the same sign. Our results stress that CI and the two new sub-aggregates are not relevant to explain future cash flows, while net income （NI） and OC1 as a whole seem to be more relevant to make explicit the future financial position. The study contributes, as a sort of post-implementation review, to the current debate on the ability of Cl to predict the future cash flows and on the real usefulness of the CI and the sub-aggregate identified by the IAS 1 revised as well.     

Multilateral Comparison of Cost Structures in the Input–Output Tables of Japan,the US and West Germany

This paper presents a multilateral comparison of relative levels and structures of costs of production in Japan, the US and West Germany. The analysis is carried out by using harmonized input–output tables, which are converted at US prices by using adjusted sectoral purchasing power parities. A new accounting methodology is derived from recent developments of index number theory, whereas the chosen multilateral comparison procedure gives results that are invariant with respect to the order of the pairs of countries examined.     

Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that regulated firms issue more debt, invest more, and enjoy higher regulated prices when they face more independent regulators, are more privatized, and when regulators are more pro‐firm. Moreover, regulatory independence, higher degree of privatization, and pro‐firm regulatory climate are associated with higher social welfare.     

On the statistical identification of DSGE models

Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are now considered attractive by the profession not only from the theoretical perspective but also from an empirical standpoint. As a consequence of this development, methods for diagnosing the fit of these models are being proposed and implemented. In this article we illustrate how the concept of statistical identification, that was introduced and used by Spanos [Spanos, Aris, 1990. The simultaneous-equations model revisited: Statistical adequacy and identification. Journal of Econometrics 44, 87–105] to criticize traditional evaluation methods of Cowles Commission models, could be relevant for DSGE models. We conclude that the recently proposed model evaluation method, based on the DSGE–VAR(λ)$\left(\lambda \right)$, might not satisfy the condition for statistical identification. However, our application also shows that the adoption of a FAVAR as a statistically identified benchmark leaves unaltered the support of the data for the DSGE model and that a DSGE–FAVAR can be an optimal forecasting model.     

Risk and Crisis Management in the Reformed European Agricultural Policy

Currently there is ample discussion among EU Institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, and Member States' governments) on the opportunity for setting up a comprehensive EU‐wide framework on risk and crises in agriculture. In the meantime, within the limits of the WTO rules on agriculture, national governments are allowed to intervene through direct compensation to farmers in case of exceptional events that cause damages to farming operations and through subsidies to crop insurance programs. Such schemes are quite expensive for domestic budgets and some Member States are trying to switch some of their cost to the Community's budget, although an expansion of financial resources devoted to agriculture in Europe is rather unlikely. Moving from the recently emanated proposal of the European Commission, this paper discusses the main issues related to public intervention for risk and crises management in agriculture. Actuellement, les institutions européennes (Commission européenne, Parlement européen et gouvernements des pays membres) discutent intensément de l'opportunité d'élaborer un cadre général pour l'ensemble de l'Union européenne sur les crises et les risques dans le secteur agricole. Entre‐temps, selon les règles de l'OMC sur l'agriculture, les gouvernements nationaux peuvent intervenir en accordant des compensations financières directes aux agriculteurs en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles causant des dommages aux exploitations agricoles ainsi que des subventions aux programmes d'assurance récolte. Ces interventions amputent considérablement les budgets nationaux, et certains pays membres tentent de transférer une partie de leurs coûts au budget de l'Union européenne, bien qu'il soit peu probable que les ressources financières consacrées à l'agriculture en Europe augmentent. A la lumière de la récente proposition de la Commission européenne, le présent article traite des principaux thèmes liés à l'intervention publique dans la gestion des risques et des crises dans le secteur agricole.     

TALKING LESS AND MOVING THE MARKET MORE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECB AND THE FED

This paper examines and compares the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and their effectiveness. First, we find that the surprise components of both monetary policy actions and statements have important but differing effects on asset prices, with unexpected communication having a much greater impact on longer‐term interest rates. Second, both the ECB and the Fed have proven to be equally successful in moving their domestic asset prices using either monetary policy or news shocks. However, the response of the American yield curve to the surprise component of Fed's statements is larger than the reaction of the European term structure to ECB's announcements. This result is intimately related to the amplitude of the policy rate cycle that is much larger in the US than in the euro area combined with the bounded support of the news shock. Third, we analyze the cross‐effects and show that the Fed has been more able to move the European interest rates of all maturities than the ECB to move American rates. This finding is tied to the predominance of dollar fixed income assets rather than to an attempt of the ECB to mimic the Fed.     

Measuring the Impact of Longevity Risk on Pension Systems: The Case of Italy

This article estimates the impact of longevity risk on pension systems by combining the prediction based on a Lee-Carter mortality model with the projected pension payments for different cohorts of retirees. We measure longevity risk by the difference between the upper bound of the total old-age pension expense and its mean estimate. This difference is as high as 4% of annual GDP over the period 2040–2050. The impact of longevity risk is sizeably reduced, but not fully eliminated, by the introduction of indexation of retirement age to expected life at retirement. Our evidence speaks in favor of a market for longevity risk and calls for a closer scrutiny of the potential redistributive effects of longevity risk.     

Evaluation of the opportunity cost of the spectrum: Application to the digital dividend

The transition to digital television transmission (DTT) creates an opportunity for revising the current allocation and use of the spectrum, and for enhancing its efficiency. The fairly large amount of spectrum that will be freed up in the analog TV switch-off is known as the digital dividend. Many EU countries have decided to partially allocate these frequencies, through market mechanisms, to mobile use, but a large fraction of the dividend is supposed to remain in the hands of broadcasters. An efficient management of the spectrum requires that the use of this resource should be supported through appropriate incentive policies. This paper presents a techno-analytical approach to evaluate the opportunity cost of using a spectrum portion within the digital dividends’ bandwidths, for example around 800-900 MHz, for both DVB-T and UMTS services, specifically addressing the extraordinary rise in the use of mobile broadband in the European context. The methodology is then applied to Italy to derive a baseline for administered prices reflecting the cost of spectrum use. Results obtained are then compared with existing evidences from other studies and Countries’ experiences.