The ethical issue of international bribery: A study of attitudes among U.S. business professionals

Restrictions upon international bribery by U.S. business firms, as incorporated in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have been controversial since this legislation was passed in 1977. Despite many attempts to repeal or change the law, it remains as originally enacted.This article reports on a survey of U.S. business professionals concerning international bribery. Response to our survey reveals a divided business community in terms of their opinions on the ethics of international payments prohibited by the present law.In addition to a lack of consensus about the morality of payments, the survey also reveals a diversity in the viewpoints of respondents. Moralism, pragmatism, cultural relativism, and legalism are four distinct underlying assumptions apparent in the attitudes of U.S. business professionals on the issue of questionable international payments. Justin G. Longenecker is an Emeritus Chavanne Professor of Christian Ethics in Business at Baylor University. He has written several articles and he is the co-author of two books: Small Business Management (1987) and Management (1984). Joseph A. McKinney is Professor of Economics and Co-Director of Master of International Management Program at Baylor University. His articles have been published in journals such as Atlantic Economic Journal and Columbia Journal of World Business. Carlos W. Moore is an Edwin W. Streetman Professor of Marketing at Baylor University. He is the co-author of Small Business Management (Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Company, 1987).     

Time-Varying Mortgage Prepayment Penalties

Recent empirical findings reveal that prepayment decisions of commercial property owners are slower than predicted by the pure options-pricing model (OPM). Borrower decisions appearing slow, however, may be quite rational when prepayment penalties of a time-varying nature are incorporated into the OPM. This article uses a competing risks OPM, adjusted for each of four different categories of prepayment penalties, to analyze borrower prepayment behavior. We find the value of delaying prepayment is often higher for mortgages with declining-rate penalties than for mortgages with static-rate penalties, frequently requiring a substantially higher interest rate spread to trigger a refinance. Multifamily loan prepayment records reveal the type of prepayment pattern that the adjusted OPM indicate should occur, reducing the gap between empirical findings and theoretical predictions. The results have implications for the specification of regressions fit to historical data, for the pricing of newly originated commercial mortgages, and for pricing in the single-family market where prepayment penalties are reemerging.     

City centre regeneration in the context of the 2001 european capital of culture in Porto, Portugal

In 2001, the city of Porto hosted the European Capital of Culture event. 'Porto 2001' was a year-long programme of arts, cultural events and urban regeneration activities. The purpose of this article is to discuss the city centre regeneration operation conducted in conjunction with the European Capital of Culture initiative in Porto. My objective is to extract a set of lessons learned that can be useful to other cities pursuing the same designation and strategy. The key finding is that despite rich and well-participated cultural events, too much emphasis was put on attracting public investment to regenerate the public space, replacing infrastructures, and modernizing cultural facilities. This was done at the expense of institutional capacity building and boosting civic creativity.     

The Organisation of Wage Bargaining in Divisionalised Firms

This paper analyses the organisation of wage bargaining in multiproduct firms since it affects the distribution of power between workers and firms. We assume that each firm has two plants and chooses who bargains the wage with the workers: either the head of the firm or the manager of each plant. Similarly, in each firm, its workers choose whether they set up plant unions or a single union.