Price and tick size preferences in trading activity changes around stock split executions

We investigate the low prices preferences and the optimal relative tick size hypotheses, as possible explanations of the stock split execution effects in a pure order-driven and multi-tick market. Using intraday data for the Spanish Stock Exchange during 1997-2001, we find that stock splits do not improve liquidity but do change trading composition. Following splits, small trades from retail investors increase significantly, especially in the larger stock splits. However, we find that this effect seems to disappear with the new tick-size rules adopted by Spanish market in 1999. We extend the optimal relative tick size hypothesis for a multi-tick market by considering the effects of stock splits on the absolute tick size. We observe that the increase in small trades occurs only in those splits that increase the relative tick and decrease the tick-size simultaneously. Our findings suggest that small investors are attracted by stock splits that cause an absolute tick-size reduction, which are those with relatively lower transaction costs.JEL Classification: G19, G32, G35We thank two anonymous referees and the editor, J.M. Campa, for their comments and for providing us very helpful guidance on how to improve the paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Dirección General de Investigación del Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BEC2002-03797. A first version of this study has been published in the working paper series of the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, IVIE. Any remaining errors are the authors responsibility.     

Adam Smith’s liberalism

The Review of Austrian Economics - In recent years studies have appeared that highlighted Adam Smith’s interventionist recommendations. These opinions are not new. The exceptions to...     

Do shareholder protection and creditor rights have distinct effects on the association between debt maturity and ownership structure?

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by country-level governance factors that enhance outside monitoring by minority shareholders and debtholders. Our investigation is based on a dataset of 50,599 firm-year observations from 38 countries. We use a propensity-score matching approach and find that the effect of ownership concentration on debt maturity is conditional to country-level governance attributes. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on debt maturity in countries where both shareholder protection and creditor rights are weak. Ownership concentration, however, tends to lengthen debt maturity as protection increases, and this positive effect on the length of debt maturity is stronger in countries enhancing protection towards debtholders (instead of shareholders). We also explore other characteristics of ownership structure, such as the identity and presence of controlling shareholders. These results corroborate the view that entrenched shareholders may use debt maturity opportunistically. Our study provides new insights into the interplay between firm- and country-level governance mechanisms and a deeper understanding of cross-country differences in the association between ownership structure and debt financing.