Entry and Managerial Incentives: A Note

This note reinforces the results in a paper by Sen (International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 11, 1993, pp. 123–37). It is shown that his assumption that the incentive schemes in a two‐period model are the same for the two periods is not necessary for the results: only the long‐term nature of contracts with managers matters.     

Why is timing perverse?

The existence of negative market timing, even for passive portfolios, poses a relevant puzzle when assessing portfolio management. In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical model so as to explain why such perverse market timing might occur and why those stocks with the lowest beta in upward markets exhibit pronounced negative timing. Our explanation is based on the existence of higher correlations of stocks in down markets than in up markets. We find that changes in beta, which drives timing, has four components; however, just two of these, mean covariance shift and covariances dispersion map, serve to explain the asymmetric behavior across stocks. We find that a high percentage of the negative market timing ability identified for mutual funds in the literature could be explained by this bias.     

Competitiveness, resources, and capabilities: empirical evidence from retail banking

This research aims to identify and measure bank employee perceptions of the determinants of competitiveness in terms of resources, skills, and capabilities within the retail banking sector. All the 40 branches of a leading Portuguese bank—the Caixa Geral de Depósitos—operating in two Portuguese districts were surveyed. Our results show that bank competitiveness differs according to performance evaluation, human resource (HR) planning, the system of incentives, and managerial motivation. They also demonstrate that human capital is a source of success in the business of banks, which relies heavily on stable and enduring relationships with customers. The study also provides recommendations for retail bank managers seeking to refine their HR strategies as a means of improving their competitiveness.     

An Optimal Strategy for Capacity Expansion

A mathematical model is developed for determining the optimal sequence of expansions for a processing industry. The demand for the output is increasing over time at a geometric rate. The economic objective is minimization of the present worth of the total system cost to meet this growing demand. The cost includes the expenditure for development and operation of local plants and the cost of importing products when the supply from these plants is not adequate to meet the demand.

For illustrative purposes the model is applied to find the expansion strategy for the primary aluminum industry in Argentina.     

Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games

This paper proves the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games: for a generic assignment of utilities to networks, the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria is finite.     

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STOCK REPURCHASES?

Stock repurchases by U.S. companies experienced a remarkable surge in the 1980s and ‘90s. Indeed, in 1998, the total value of all stock repurchased by U.S. companies exceeded for the first time the total amount paid out as cash dividends. And the U.S. repurchase movement has gone global in the past few years, spreading not only to Canada and the U.K., but also to countries like Japan and Germany, where such transactions were prohibited until recently. Why are companies buying back their stock in such amounts? After dismissing the popular argument that stock repurchases boost earnings per share, the authors argue that repurchases serve to add value in two main ways: (1) they provide managers with a tax‐efficient means of returning excess capital to shareholders and (2) they allow managers to “signal” to investors their view that the firm is undervalued. Returning excess capital is value‐adding for two reasons: First, it helps prevent companies from pursuing growth and size at the expense of profitability and value. Second, by returning capital to investors, repurchases (like dividends) play the critically important economic function of allowing investors to channel their investment from mature or declining sectors of the economy to more promising ones. But if stock repurchases and dividends serve the same basic economic function, why are repurchases growing more rapidly? Part of the explanation is that, because repurchases are taxed as capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, repurchases are a more tax‐efficient way of distributing excess capital. But perhaps even more important than their tax treatment is the flexibility that (at least) open market repurchases provide corporate managers‐flexibility to make small adjustments in capital structure, to exploit (or correct) perceived undervaluation of the firm's shares, and possibly even to increase the liquidity of the stock, which could be particularly valuable in bear markets. For U.S. regulators, the growth in open market stock repurchases raises some interesting issues. Perhaps most important, companies are not required to (and rarely do) furnish their investors with details about a given program's structure, execution method, number of shares repurchased, or even its duration. Policy regulators (and corporate executives as well) should consider some of the benefits provided by other systems, notably Canada's, which provide greater transparency and more guidelines for the repurchase process.     

An automatic Portmanteau test for serial correlation

This article introduces a data-driven Box–Pierce test for serial correlation. The proposed test is very attractive compared to the existing ones. In particular, implementation of this test is extremely simple for two reasons: first, the researcher does not need to specify the order of the autocorrelation tested, since the test automatically chooses this number; second, its asymptotic null distribution is chi-square with one degree of freedom, so there is no need of using a bootstrap procedure to estimate the critical values. In addition, the test is robust to the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Finally, the proposed test presents higher power in simulations than the existing ones for models commonly employed in empirical finance.     

Book essay on Flemming Hansen and Sverre Riis Christensen (2007), Emotions, advertising and consumer choice

Hansen and Christensen discuss a wide range of current issues regarding the role of emotions in consumer behavior as well as measures of advertising effectiveness. The central theme of the book is the elaboration and application of a new tool to measure the emotional constructions that consumers develop for branded fast moving consumer goods. The authors call this measure NERS, which stands for Net Emotional Response Strength. The book appeals to both intermediate and advanced academic readers due to the comprehensiveness of its literature review and the depth of its theoretical developments. The present essay critically comments the contents of the book and then, based on the context provided by the book, discusses in further detail some salient aspects of the role of emotions in consumer choice that deserve special attention. In particular, it is pointed out how some findings from behavioral decision research could improve the conceptualizations offered by Hansen and Christensen.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.