Identity Orientation,Organizational Identification,and Leadership Involvement

The present study relies on theories of authentic and relational leadership, as well as the identity orientation model, to study leadership involvement in volunteer organizations. We propose that self‐expression and social cohesion—the opportunity organizational membership provides people to express who they are and to develop social relationships—are related to organizational identification and leadership involvement. We posit that self‐expression and social cohesion satisfy personal and relational identification motives and increase organizational identification—a form of identification with a collective—which in turn affect leadership involvement. The hypotheses are tested using structural equations modeling using a sample of 210 professional association members, a nonwork sample that reduces the influence of extrinsic rewards on leadership involvement.     

Comparative cheap talk

When are comparative statements credible? We show that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about multiple issues can credibly rank the issues for a decision maker. By restricting the expert's ability to exaggerate, multidimensional cheap talk of this form permits communication when it would not be credible in a single dimension. The communication gains can be substantial with even a couple of dimensions, and the complete ranking is asymptotically equivalent to full revelation as the number of issues becomes large. Nevertheless, partial rankings are sometimes more credible and/or more profitable for the expert than the complete ranking. Comparative cheap talk is robust to asymmetries that are not too large. Consequently, for sufficiently many independent issues, there are always some issues sufficiently symmetric to permit comparative cheap talk.     

Sequential clinical scheduling with patient no-show: The impact of pre-defined slot structures

This paper develops a sequential scheduling algorithm for consultation periods not divided into slots. Patients call a scheduler and request appointments with a specified provider. The scheduler provides the patient with an appointment time before the call terminates. In making the appointment, the scheduler cannot alter the appointments of previously scheduled patients. Service times are random and each scheduled patient has a probability of “no-showing” for the appointment. Each arriving patient generates a given amount of revenue, and costs are incurred from patient waiting and provider overtime. The scheduling method selects the calling patient's appointment time by minimizing the total expected cost. We prove that total expected cost is a convex function of appointment times and that the expected profit of the schedule is unimodal, which provides a unique stopping criterion for the scheduling algorithm. Computational studies compare this approach with no-show based sequential scheduling methods for out-patient clinics where a predefined slot structure is assumed. The new method yields higher expected profit and less overtime than when service periods are pre-divided into slots. Because slot scheduling is ingrained in healthcare, we use the model to design slot structures that account for no-show and service time variation.     

Human capital, inequality, endogenous growth and educational subsidy: A theoretical analysis

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with dualism in human capital accumulation of two types of individuals. The government imposes a proportional income tax on rich individuals and uses the tax revenue to finance the educational subsidy given to poor individuals. We find out the properties of the optimal tax financed educational subsidy policy in the semi-stationary equilibrium of the model using the technique of Stackelberg differential game.     

What do information frictions do?

Summary. We present an overlapping generations model in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists and interacts with a credit market friction (costly state verification). Our main results are: (i) while credit market frictions have long- and short-run real effects, labor market frictions typically have only short-run effects unless they also affect the volume of investment per worker, (ii) the frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions may prolong the effect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamics of economies with both frictions are qualitatively similar to their frictionless counterparts.Received: 25 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E13, E24, O41, O17. Correspondence to: Joydeep BhattacharyaWork on this paper began while Bhattacharya was visiting the University of Texas at Austin and was completed when Chakraborty was visiting the IMF Institute in Washington, DC. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Rajesh Singh, participants at the Macro Tea in Austin, and especially, an anonymous referee of this journal. The usual caveat applies.