Employment and child-care choices in Canada and the United States

In this paper we examine employment and child-care choices of two-parent families with young children in the United States and Canada, using a pooled data set based on recent national surveys in each country. We find that the employment and child-care choices of Canadian families are similar to those of U.S. families. Estimates of a model of employment and child-care choices indicate significant effects of child-care subsidies, child-care prices, and wage rates on employment and child-care choices. However, none of these factors helps to explain the differences in employment and child-care choices between the two countries.
Ce mémoire examine le choix de l'emploi et du soin des enfants dans les familles où il y deux parents aux Etats-Unis et au Canada en utilisant des données d'études récentes dans les deux pays. Il appert que les choix des familles canadiennes sont semblables à ceux des familles américaines. Les calibrations d'un modèle de ces choix montrent les effets significatifs des subventions au soin des enfants, du prix des soins des enfants, et des taux de salaires sur ces choix. Cependant, aucun de ces facteurs n'explique les diffrences dans les patterns de choix entre les deux pays.     

Salary increases for the marketing executive

This article discusses how marketing executives view their pay raise. A study of 491 marketing executives examined their views on what is a meaningful salary increase and the reasons why their companies give pay raises.     

Employment and Prices in a Simple Macroeconomy

This exercise sets up interlinked labor and goods markets in a classroom macroeconomy. Students with worker roles are endowed with labor that can be consumed or sold to firms that post wages, purchase labor, and produce goods that can be either consumed or sold to workers. The money from sales is used by firms to purchase labor in the next period. Complicated record keeping is avoided by using ordinary playing cards to represent money and goods. The exercise can stimulate a discussion of potential output, unemployment, and the role of money in determining wages and prices. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory macroeconomics classes to teach concepts of the circular flow, real and money wages, unemployment, and labor market equilibrium and in intermediate classes to consider Keynesian and quantity theories. Time required: Fifteen minutes for reading instructions, 30 to 45 minutes for trading (depending on the number of periods), and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one copy of the instructions for each person and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each replicated group of two workers and one firm. No money or other incentives are required.     

Technological Scanning by Small Canadian Manufacturers

Given that in many industries new production and information technologies have fundamentally changed the way in which firms must operate and compete, the technological aspect of environmental scanning has become a critical success factor for many small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. As little is presently known about how technological scanning manifests itself in these organizations and about what determines the nature and level of this activity, a survey study of 324 Canadian firms was done. Testing a research model resulted in identifying four interrelated dimensions of scanning activity, namely scanning objectives, type of information, information sources, and management practices. Key determinants of this activity were also identified, including the firms' strategy, environmental uncertainty, production technology, level of R&D, information networks, and the owner-manager's education level.     

Convertible Securities and Bankruptcy Reforms: Addressing Too Big to Fail and Reducing the Fragility of the Financial System*

Eliminating too big to fail should be the first priority of any regulatory reform. But this is easier said than done. As the crisis has taught us, when the systemic risks are perceived to be large, regulators will be very reluctant to close down insolvent firms or impose losses on creditors. So how do we reduce these risks so that regulators can credibly commit to a policy of allowing financial companies to fail and not resort to rescues or bailouts? The author proposes two complementary approaches to this problem: The first is to design capital structures with corrective mechanisms that kick in when a financial firm displays signs of trouble, but still has positive economic capital. To this end, the author endorses the Squam Lake Report's proposal that encourages financial firms to issue convertible debt with an “automatic” provision for converting to equity. In contrast to the Squam Lake proposal, however, the author argues that the conversion to equity should not depend on regulators' decisions and should take place before individual banks and the financial system are in full crisis mode. The second approach is to design a resolution mechanism that will close failing financial firms when early intervention has not led to the firm's recovery. The author argues that the best model for this mechanism is bankruptcy, because of its resolution of claims according to predetermined rules rather than regulatory discretion. However, certain forms of early intervention can also help to lower the costs of permitting firms to fail. For example, the Squam Lake idea that financial institutions be required to develop living wills should make it easier to unwind these firms in an orderly fashion and provide regulators with insight into the degree of systemic risk that these firms impose. The author notes that the challenges associated with getting the executives of healthy banks to plan for their own bankruptcy may indicate that a better use of regulatory resources might be to view the living will as one of the tools of prompt corrective action for firms that become undercapitalized but are still solvent. Once a firm has been declared undercapitalized, regulators would have greater bargaining power to insist on a serious plan for bankruptcy.     

Optimal search auctions

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller's problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.