ON THE PREDICTABILITY OF GROWTH IN EARNINGS PER SHARE

Arguments are given to support the hypothesis that corporate earnings per share are predictable by simple forecasting models. If income numbers have predictable properties, growth is predictable and theories of corporate valuation become more credible. Notions that EPS growth are completely unpredictable are disputed.     

Monetary policy shocks and productivity measures in the G-7 countries

An implication of two-country international real business cycle models is that total factor productivity should be an exogenous stochastic process. Economic theories which feature labor hoarding, variable capacity utilization, and increasing returns predict that measured productivity shifts are not exogenous; instead, expansionary aggregate demand shocks should lead to an increase in measured productivity. For each of the G-7 countries, this paper measures quarterly aggregate total factor productivity for the domestic country and its rest-of-world (G-6) counterpart. In each case the domestic productivity measures are not strictly exogenous: expansionary U.S. monetary policy shocks, as well as other G-6 monetary policy shocks, lead to productivity expansions. The evidence indicates that international business cycle models are misspecified unless they feature endogenous productivity mechanisms.Received: June 2001, Accepted: December 2001, JEL Classification: E5, F4Correspondence to: Charles L. EvansFor their helpful comments, we thank Mario Crucini, Patricia Reynolds, and Steve Strongin. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.     

Why Exempt Doctors from the Market?

The medical profession in the United Kingdom is almost completely protected from the dissatisfaction of patients. Chris Charles, a solicitor, calls for the abolition of restrictive practices in the NHS and the re-establishment of consumer sovereignty.     

The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint

The state can be conceived as an organization to protect personal freedom and to provide public goods. Consequently, we expect a constitution to consist of two different sets of rules; rules on personal freedom and rules for making collective decisions on public goods (mostly budgetary rules). The constitution of the European Union as laid down in the treaty of Maastricht (1992) provides both types of rules, but the emphasis is mainly on the former rules. This paper investigates budgetary rules, in particular the welfare economic logic of deficit spending.     

A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects

This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026,215.     

Education for the moral development of managers: Kohlberg's stages of moral development and integrative education

Recent management behavior such as the PINTO gasoline tank decision has received a great deal of notoriety. In fact, repugnant examples of management amorality and immorality abound. One is forced to ask a number of questions. Does such behavior reflect a lack of a proper education in moral behavior? Can education result in moral behavior? If so, what kind of education might that be? Answers to these questions might point a way out of the moral shadows giant corporations have cast over much of the world. An attempt to answer these questions, then, might be a worthwhile venture.     

The case for trend-stationarity is stronger than we thought

In DeJong and Whiteman (1991a), we concluded that 11 of the 14 macroeconomic time-series originally studied by Nelson and Plosser (1982) supported trend-stationarity. Phillips (1991) criticizes this inference, claiming that our procedure is biased against integration, and that our results are sensitive to model and prior specification. However, Phillips' alternative models and priors bias his results in favour of integration; despite these biases, Phillips' own findings indicate that the data provide the greatest relative support to trend-stationarity. This result is similar to our own (1989, 1990, 1991b) findings concerning the sensitivity of our results; the trend-stationarity inference is remarkably robust.     

The allocation of a shared resource within an organization

Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM), which charges users for time and yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but, because of the prices paid, in which the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate ‘market solutions’ to organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM.