The history of consumption: A literature review and consumer guide

The history of consumption is fast becoming a vital area of academic research. For the social sciences, in general, this new field promises new insight into the great transformation of Western society. For consumer research, in particular, it promises the opportunity to create new perspectives, sources of data, and theoretical concepts. The purpose of this paper is to review recent literature on the history of consumption, and to offer a consumer guide for those who wish to use it in the study of modern consumer behavior and policy.

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Die Geschichte des Konsums: Ein Literaturüberblick und Leseführer

Zusammenfassung Die Geschichte des Konsums wird immer stärker zu einem wichtigen Gegenstand der akademischen Forschung. Für die Sozialwissenschaften im allgemeinen gilt, daß das neue Feld völlig neue Einsichten in die große Tranformation der westlichen Gesellschaften bietet. Für die Verbraucherforschung insbesondere gilt, daß es neue Perspektiven eröffnet, neues Datenmaterial erschließt und die Bildung neuer theoretischer Konzepte ermöglicht. Der vorliegende Beitrag will über die neuere Literatur über die Geschichte des Verbrauchs orientieren und Einstiegshilfen für denjenigen geben, der diese Literatur bei der Analyse des heutigen Verbraucherverhaltens und der Verbraucherpolitik benutzen möchte. Dabei warnt der Beitrag gleich zu Beginn vor einigen naheliegenden Betrachtungsfehlern, vor allem vor einer allzu gegenwartsbezogenen Betrachtung, die vergangene Perioden vorranging als die Vorwegnahme oder zumindest die Vorbereitung unserer Gegenwart auffaßt, sowie vor der Gefahr einer Projektion der eigenen Sichtweisen und Einstellungen auf eine andere Zeit, also die Erforschung einer vergangenen Zeit ausschließlich mit Denkweisen von heute.Die weiteren Abschnitte behandeln die verschiedenen Zusammenhänge, in denen Konsum gesehen werden kann: den kulturellen, den soziologischen, psychologischen, politischen und intellektuellen Kontext, sowie den Marketing- und den Verbraucherkontext. Diese Überlegungen können — so die Schlußfolgerung des Beitrages — einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu der Frage beitragen, weshalb sich in den westlichen Gesellschaften so große Veränderungen ergeben haben, die sich nicht nur in einer industriellen Revolution, sondern auch in einer Konsumrevolution niedergeschlagen haben.

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Grant McCracken is Assistant Professor, Department of Consumer Studies, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1, Canada. He wishes to thank Russell Belk, Victor Roth, Montrose Sommers, Richard Vosburgh, and anonymous referees for their comments on this paper.     

An empirical test of trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships

This study examines three trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships. This study, based on a sample of more than 400 business-to-business salespeoples from a variety of industries, shows two trust-building processes (predictive and identification) to be significantly related to salesperson trust in the sales manager. Interpersonal trust was found to be most strongly related to shared values and respect. Trust was directly related to job satisfaction and relationalism, and indirectly related to organizational commitment and turnover intention. Thomas G. Brashear (brashear@mktg.umass.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. James S. Boles (jboles@gsu.edu) (Ph.D., Louisiana State University) is an associate professor of marketing in the Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a variety of journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His areas of research interest include personal selling, sales management, key and strategic account management, and business relationships. Danny N. Bellenger (mktdnb@langate.gsu.edu) (Ph.D., University of Alabama) is currently chairman of the Marketing Department in the Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals including theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Advertising Research, theCalifornia Management Review, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of Business Research. He has authored four monographs and four textbooks on marketing research, sales, and retailing. Charles M. Brooks (brooks@quinnipiac.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an associate professor and chair of the Department of Marketing and Advertising at Quinnipiac University. His research has appeared in theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of Retailing, Marketing Theory, and theJournal of Marketing Theory and Practice.     

Production, trade, prices, exchange rates and equilibration in large experimental economies

We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are “international” in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described.     

Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

Estimating Market Power in the South African Banking Sector

Indicators of market power can be ambiguous because cost economies associated with scale and not market imperfections may influence results. This article illustrates that without direct measures of concentration, estimates of costs, scale economies and profitability can be used to identify market power in banking. Secondly, via this method, econometric estimates provide meaningful evidence of market power in the South African banking sector over the study sample period (1979–1998). A reasonable conclusion is that while industrial structure is important, careful consideration needs to be given to cost economies and profitability when assessing market power. In addition, there is a need to consider appropriate policy to reduce market power in banking in South Africa.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

A model of project evaluation with limited attention

Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work.     

Veblen's Theory of Institutional Change: An Explanation of the Deregulation of Japanese Financial Markets

A bstract In his 1915 essay "The Opportunity of Japan," Thorstein Veblen theorized that traditionai Japanese institutions would undergo evolutionary change as Japan exploited borrowed industrial technology and became integrated into the global business enterprise system. This article explains the recent liberalization of Japanese financial markets which followed Japan's rise to economic prominence within the context of Veblen's theory of institutional development of the enterprise system. The Japanese process of financial deregulation is reviewed, Veblen's predictions Japan are presented and an explanation provided for the liberalization of Japanese financial markets .