从政府治理结构看服务型政府的建设

要在科学发展观引导下符合逻辑地设计出科学的政绩观，把在军事斗争时期有效使用的官员层级结构（各级政府）的纵向委托——代理关系改造为真正快速和有效代表民意的横向委托——代理关系，的最大化目标与民众的福利效用目标函数趋同的基础条件。要设计出代理人“剩余索取机识形态的学习和教育过程与治理结构互动，进而追求在经济人范式基础上的激励——约束与函数中利他主义和自我约束的结合，这是除了法律之外有效防止“政府俘获”、寻租腐败的不手段。增强政府行政和决策程序信息流动性、提高透明度对“良政治理”、建设服务型政府具有重要影响。     

关于会计理论体系逻辑起点问题的研究

本文在回顾我国关于会计理论体系逻辑起点研究成果的基础上,分析了以会计假设、会计本质、会计环境、会计目标作为逻辑起点的缺陷及新的研究趋向--双起点论的不足,认为应将会计对象作为会计理论体系的逻辑起点。对于同样以会计对象作为逻辑起点的观点,由于各学者对会计对象内涵定义的不同,其构建的理论体系是存在偏差的。笔者认为以价值增值运动为会计对象是合理的选择,并以此作为逻辑起点构建了会计理论体系的粗略框架。     

区域经济增长理论与经济非均衡发展

我国区域经济发展正迎来一个新时期.如何借鉴西方主流区域经济理论为我所用,是一个亟待解决的问题.本主要介绍区域经济的增长理论和增长模式,并结合中国实际进行简要评论.遵循发展规律,中国区域经济的路径选择是非均衡协调发展模式.     

注册会计师审计职业道德建设的理性思考

独立的审计人员已成为治理会计信息舞弊的一种不可或缺的外部监控机制,其审计质量的高低直接关系到会计信息舞弊治理的成效。要胜任这一角色,审计的独立性无疑是保证质量的根本所在,而职业能力的水平也是导致审计职业的信誉和社会地位的重要要件。本文通过调查问卷方式,对我国审计专业判断能力在职业中的认识进行了调查和分析,以此作为提高审计职业道德的重要途径的建议。     

More pessimism than greediness: a characterization of monotone risk aversion in the rank-dependent expected utility model

Summary. This paper studies monotone risk aversion, the aversion to monotone, mean-preserving increase in risk (Quiggin [21]), in the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model. This model replaces expected utility by another functional, characterized by two functions, a utility function u in conjunction with a probability-perception function f. Monotone mean-preserving increases in risk are closely related to the notion of comparative dispersion introduced by Bickel and Lehmann [3,4] in Non-parametric Statistics. We present a characterization of the pairs (u,f) of monotone risk averse decision makers, based on an index of greediness G _u of the utility function u and an index of pessimism P _f of the probability perception function f: the decision maker is monotone risk averse if and only if . The index of greediness (non-concavity) of u is the supremum of taken over . The index of pessimism of f is the infimum of taken over 0 < v < 1. Thus, , with G _u = 1 iff u is concave. If then , i.e., f is majorized by the identity function. Since P _f = 1 for Expected Utility maximizers, forces u to be concave in this case; thus, the characterization of risk aversion as is a direct generalization from EU to RDEU. A novel element is that concavity of u is not necessary. In fact, u must be concave only if P _f = 1.Received: 10 April 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81. Correspondence to: Michéle CohenAlain Chateauneuf, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson: We are most grateful to Mark Machina, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments.     

Review of tourism resources valuation

Tourism resources valuation is now a hot issue of the science of tourism resources, resources economics and environmental economics. This paper reviews research progresss on tourism resources valuation, introduces its theoretic basis, and elaborates two classical valuation methods： TCM and CVM. And two existing problems are discussed Firstly, tourism resources value constitution system is still under dispute. This paper puts forward the Value constitution system based on present value categories. Secondly, tourism resources valuation methods need further studies because both TCM and CVM have deficiencies. Finally, the paper points out the development direction of tourism resources valuation.     

高职“订单培养”实施条件探析

高职教育培养目标是以培养技术应用能力为主,将学生培养成具有一定理论知识的高等技术应用型人才。订单培养是培养高级应用型人才的一种重要方式,文章从政府、学校、企业、学生等几个角度详细阐述了订单培养所需要的条件。     

Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions

Summary. Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using shill bidders. Also, if the identities of the bidders and their bids are not published then it would be difficult to verify the bid of a colluding bidder. This paper addresses these problems in one shot second price auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism which depends only on the auction price is introduced. It induces a successful collusion, eliminates the verification problem, provides no incentive for the use of shill bidders and guarantees that the proponent obtains ex-post non-negative payoff. The colluding bidders are ex-ante strictly better off compared with the competitive case, irrespective of their types.Received: 27 November 2002, Revised: 28 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.Yair Tauman: Correspondence toWe would like to thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Shmuel Zamir for a helpful discussion.     

"谨慎投资者规则"与我国基金管理人注意义务的法律完善

美国信托法中的“谨慎投资音规则”是在历经法定投资表和谨慎人规则两个阶段的演进中吸收了现代投资组合理论而形成的。“谨慎投资者规则”作为受托人的一项法定投资原则，不仅比较契舍当今证券投资的实际需要，而且也很好地防范了基金管理人对投资权力的滥用，目前已成为越采越多国家规范基金管理人注意义务的主要依据。我们很有必要对之加以吸收和借鉴，以使我国基金管理人注意义务的内容更为精细化。     

提升我国国际竞争力的主要途径初探

运用系统范式分析现代国家竞争力的构成因素,应当包括企业行为,产业环境,要素禀赋,国家政治、经济、文化、人口、科技、习俗,国际环境等。这些在国家、产业、企业发展中的不同阶段中具有不同作用,国家和企业应据此采取相应的措施,作为形成和提升国家竞争力的基本途径。