Substitution Possibility between Unpriced Pulp and Wastepaper in the U.S. Paper and Paperboard Industry

A greater use of recycled wastepaper would preserve virgin forests as well as reducing the amount of wastepaper going to landfills. These environmental goals depend critically on the elasticity of substitution between pulp and wastepaper in producing paper and paperboard. Since most of the pulp consumed by U.S. paper mills and paperboard mills is transferred internally from vertically integrated pulp mills, the price data on pulp is not available. This paper constructs an econometric model which enables us to estimate the substitution possibility between unpriced pulp and wastepaper in the U.S. paper and paperboard industry. Empirical results show that the elasticity of substitution between unpriced pulp and wastepaper is positive, but not statistically significant.     

三峡水电：高效精益生产管理

通过实施精益生产管理,三峡水力发电厂实现了“安全、效益、人才”三赢,为我国大型电厂和巨型机组的运行管理开辟了新思路。     

Effect of perceived conflict among multiple performance goals and goal difficulty on task performance

Contemporary performance measurement systems, such as the balanced scorecard, often advocate the use of an array of financial and non‐financial measures. Despite many claimed advantages for these systems, recent research shows that the inclusion of multiple performance measures sometimes has undesirable effects. The present study examines one of the potential problems of implementing these systems; namely, the impact of perceived goal conflict on task performance. Using survey data from employees working in multiple call centres in a telecommunication company, we find that perceived goal difficulty increases perceived goal conflict. Additionally, perceived goal difficulty also has a negative, indirect effect of task performance, through the mediating role of perceived goal conflict. Our results have important implications for both the research literature and the designers of performance measurement systems.     

Limited participation and the closed-end fund discount

In this paper, we present economic forces that affect the closed-end fund share price using a simple two-period model with limited participation. We characterize three economic forces: management fee, principal-agent problem effect and diversification benefit effect. The role of the management fee is consistent with recent studies by Ross [Ross S., 2002. Neoclassical finance, alternative finance and the closed end fund puzzle. European Financial Management 8, 129–137, Ross, S., 2002. A neoclassical look at behavioral finance: closed end funds. The Princeton lectures in finance III] and findings of various empirical studies [e.g., Kumar, R., Noronha, G.M., 1992. A re-examination of the relationship between closed-end fund discounts and expenses. Journal of Financial Research 15(2) Summer, 139–147; Russel, P.S., 2005. Closed-end fund pricing: The puzzle, the explanations, and some new evidence, Journal of Business and Economic Studies 11(1), 34–49; Gemmill, G., Thomas, D.C., 2002. Noise trading, costly arbitrage, and asset prices: Evidence from closed end funds. Journal of Finance 57(6), 2571–2594]. The model’s principal-agent problem effect is consistent with empirical findings by Brickley et al. [Brickley, James, Steven Manaster, Schallheim, James, 1991. The tax-timing option and the discounts on closed-end investment companies. Journal of Business 64, 287–312] of positive relation between the fund discount and the average variance of the constituent assets in the fund portfolio. In addition, it provides a theoretical framework for empirical studies, which examine the role of agency costs [Barclay, Michael J., Clifford G. Holderness, Jeffrey Pontiff, 1993. Private benefits from block ownership and discounts on closed-end funds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 263–291] and compensation contracts [Coles, J., Suay, J., Woodbury, D., 2000. Fund advisor compensation in closed-end funds. Journal of Finance 55 (3), 1385–1414; Deli, Daniel N., 2002. Mutual fund advisory contracts: An empirical Investigation. Journal of Finance 57(1), 109–133] on the behavior of fund managers and fund discounts. The model’s diversification benefit effect supports the result in [Bonser-Neal C., Brauer,G., Neal, R.., Wheatley, S., 1990. International investment restrictions and closed-end country fund prices. Journal of Finance 45, 523–547] that announcement of financial market liberalization is associated with a decrease in the fund premium. It also supports the findings of [Kumar, R., Noronha, G.M., 1992. A re-examination of the relationship between closed-end fund discounts and expenses. Journal of Financial Research 15(2) Summer, 139–147; Chay, J.B., Trzcinka, Charles A., 1999. Managerial performance and the cross-sectional pricing of closed-end funds. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 379–408] of a positive relation between current premium and the risk-adjusted return over the following year.     

Intraday volume and volatility relations with and without public news

This paper reexamines the dynamic relation between intraday trading volume and return volatility of large and small NYSE stocks in two partitioned samples, with and without identifiable public news. We argue that the sequential information arrival hypothesis (SIAH) can be tested only in periods containing public news. After partitioning the sample into periods with and without public news, we find bi-directional Granger-causality between volume and volatility in the presence of public information as hypothesized by the SIAH. Our analysis further suggests that return volatility is higher in the periods with public news, while trading volume is significantly higher in the no-news period; perhaps owing to the importance of private information for trading stocks. Using the sample without public news, we find evidence that volume Granger-causes volatility without feedback. These results are broadly consistent with behavioral models like the overconfidence and biased self-attribution model of [Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security market under- and over-reactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839–1885]. It appears that overconfident investors overrate the precision of their private news signals and therefore trade too aggressively in the absence of public news; when public news arrives, investors’ biased self-attribution triggers excessive return volatility.