When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

This experimental article helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. It manipulates the pay-off in case both players defect in a two-player, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed. All motives are significant but some become only significant if one controls for all remaining ones. This seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been successful.     

Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.     

Does female management influence firm performance? Evidence from Luxembourg banks

In this study, we examine the relationship between the proportion of women in top management positions at banks and these institutions’ financial performance. Using prudential data from supervisory reporting for all credit institutions in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg from 1999 to 2013, we find a positive association between female management and firm performance. The economic effect is substantial: a 10 % increase in women in top management positions improves the bank’s future return on equity by more than 3 % p.a. Moreover, we show that this positive relationship is (i) almost twice as large during the global financial crisis than in stable market conditions and (ii) non-linear, with banks having 20–40 % female management being the most successful.     

The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well‐defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.     

Environmentally Important Inter sectoral Flows: Insights from Main Contributions Identification and Minimal Flow Analysis

For the analysis of economic interdependences form an environmental perspective, a condensation of the information contained in input–output (IO) tables is desirable, but without much loss of the quantitative dimension. For the case of total energy requirements, main contributions identification is presented as an approach that allows a partitioning of total energy requirements by production layers and (final) energy-consuming sectors. For this purpose, a mixed monetary-energy IO model and a partitioning procedure are used. In addition, minimal flow analysis as a graphical method is used to detect importnant energetic interconnections. Environmentally Important Intersectoral Flows     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

On the cost of delayed currency fixing announcements

In Foreign Exchange Markets vanilla and barrier options are traded frequently. The market standard is a cutoff time of 10:00 a.m. in New York for the strike of vanillas and a knock-out event based on a continuously observed barrier in the inter bank market. However, many clients, particularly from Italy, prefer the cutoff and knock-out event to be based on the fixing published by the European Central Bank on the Reuters Page ECB37. These barrier options are called discretely monitored barrier options. While these options can be priced in several models by various techniques, the ECB source of the fixing causes two problems. First of all, it is not tradable, and secondly it is published with a delay of about 10–20 min. We examine here the effect of these problems on the hedge of those options and consequently suggest a cost based on the additional uncertainty encountered.      

Das leere Versprechen der aktiven Konjunktursteuerung

Since the financial crisis and the ensuing sluggish recovery, a growing number of voices have called for a more active role for fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. We reject this call and argue that in normal times, monetary policy and automatic stabilisers are sufficient to smooth the business cycle. The effectiveness of active fiscal policy is too uncertain and the requirements for a sensible adjustment are too high. Moreover, determining the state of the business cycle is almost impossible in real time. The benefits of active fiscal policy therefore do not outweigh its costs. Only in exceptional situations should policy makers consider active fiscal policy measures as an option.     

Argumente gegen die Reform des Stabilitätsgesetzes wenig überzeugend — eine Replik

In their reply, Dullien and van Treeck criticise the argument of Michaelis, Elstner and Schmidt that the German Stability and Growth law (StabG) from the 1960s must not be reformed. They claim that Michaelis et al. neglect that the concept of sustainability has changed over the past 50 years and that nowadays issues such as social and ecological sustainability should be included. Moreover, the claim by Michaelis et al. that the StabG provides important tools for business cycle management is hardly convincing, given that these tools have not been used since the 1970s and stimulus packages have been passed on other legal grounds. / In their response Michaelis et al. stress that economic policy has to consider equally aspects of economic, social and ecological sustainability. The StabG, however, is a completely inappropriate basis for attempts to address aspects of social and ecological sustainability. The main use of the StabG consists in the possibility to quickly implement fiscal measures that could mitigate the consequences of severe economic downturns. Proposals of Dullien and van Treeck that various dimensions of sustainability are controllable by a predetermined set of instruments neglect the complexity of the social market economy.