To improve investors' valuation of accounting earnings in emerging markets: evidence from Taiwan

The valuation of accounting earnings is related to the level of earnings management used by the firm. In emerging markets where earnings management is typically pervasive, investors lose confidence in accounting earnings and thus tend to under‐value earnings. Using data from Taiwan, we show that better governance characteristics are associated with improved investor valuation of accounting earnings. Under weaker governance structures, such as excessive control on the part of majority shareholders, small board size, and chief executive officer/chairman of the board duality, the market tends to under‐value accounting earnings. Reducing controlling shareholders' ownership, increasing board size, and reinforcing the monitoring function of the board improves investors' ability to value accounting earnings. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy

In this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.