Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

Information asymmetry and the speed of adjustment: debasements in the mid‐sixteenth century

This article examines the impact of information asymmetry on the movement of London–Antwerp exchange rates against the backdrop of the Great Debasement of 1544–51. The case of the revaluation of gold coins in the Habsburg Netherlands in 1539, about which the sovereign and the public possessed similar information, is used as the benchmark to judge how far the speed of adjustment was affected by information asymmetry. This article is also part of the recent literature that estimates the degree of financial market integration in late medieval and early modern Europe. In the framework of the threshold autoregressive model, the speed of adjustment and the transaction costs associated with arbitrage are estimated, and the results are judged using the speed of communication as a benchmark since the flow of information played a critical role in financial arbitrage. The results reveal that the sixteenth‐century London–Antwerp exchange markets were already as integrated as that during the late nineteenth century, but information asymmetry severely disturbed the effectiveness of exchange arbitrage.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.     

How credible is the North Korean threat?

We perform event analysis on particular episodes of tension in the Korean peninsula between 2000 and 2008, and investigate the effect of the events on South Korean financial markets (stock markets, bond yield spreads and the exchange rate) given that South Korea would be the first affected by a military aggression from North Korea. Surprisingly, in nearly all cases, these events, which have often been dramatized in the world media, have no significant impact on either of these variables or only a very small one. We also find no significant impact of events on listed firms that would a priori be likely to suffer from increased tension between the two Koreas. Since financial markets often contain better predictions than expert opinions or surveys, these results strongly suggest that the North Korean threat is non‐credible.     

TRADE AND DIVERGENCE IN EDUCATION SYSTEMS

This article presents a theory on the endogenous choice of education policy and the two‐way causal relationship between trade and education systems. A country's education system determines its talent distribution and comparative advantage; the possibility of trade by raising the returns to the sector of comparative advantage in turn induces countries to further differentiate their education systems and reinforces the initial pattern of comparative advantage. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium choice of education systems by two countries interacting strategically are necessarily more divergent than their autarky choices, and yet less than what is socially optimal for the world.     

Does the Quality of Corporate Governance Affect Firm Valuation and Risk? Evidence from a Corporate Governance Scorecard in Hong Kong*

Using Hong Kong firm data, we construct an index of corporate governance during 2002–2005, which scores the corporate governance practices of listed companies from the public shareholders' perspective based on the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance. The findings show that family firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures are associated with bad corporate governance. The evidence also shows that these firms improve their corporate governance practices slower than their peers. Overall, the quality of corporate governance is very significant in explaining future company stock returns and risk. Good corporate governance is associated with both higher stock returns and with lower risk. Improvements in corporate governance are associated with significantly higher stock returns and lower company risk.     

Tracking Can Be More Equitable Than Mixing

Parents and policy‐makers often wonder whether and how the choice of a tracked or mixed educational system affects the equality of opportunity. I answer this question by analyzing the influence of peers on future educational results. I define an equal opportunity policy as one that maximizes the average lifetime income of the worst‐off type of individuals in society (i.e., students from disadvantaged backgrounds). I find that tracking maximizes average lifetime income if the opportunity cost of college attendance is sufficiently high.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH,PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS,AND THE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS PROCESS*

Individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex, highly persistent dynamics. We investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with on‐the‐job search, wage renegotiation by mutual consent, and i.i.d. productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earnings, the evolution of individual earnings mean, and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment, or the distribution of year‐to‐year earnings changes. Structural estimation of our model on a 12‐year panel of highly educated British workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure that is remarkably consistent with the data.