Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships

We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation—as under public‐‐private partnerships—can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.     

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.      

Arbitration systems and negotiations

We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by accepting the settlement of an arbitrator. The impact of pragmatic arbitrators—that enforce concessions that precede their appointment—is compared with that of arbitrators that act on principle—ignoring prior concessions. We show that while the impact of arbitration always depends on how costly that intervention is relative to direct negotiation, the range of scenarios for which it has an impact, and the precise effect of such impact, does change depending on the behavior—pragmatic or on principle—of the arbitrator. Moreover the requirement of mutual consent to appoint the arbitrator matters only when he is pragmatic. Efficiency and equilibrium are not aligned since agents sometimes reach negotiated agreements when an arbitrated settlement is more efficient and vice versa. What system of arbitration has the best performance depends on the arbitration and negotiation costs, and each can be optimal for plausible environments.      

An Exploration of the Conceptual and Empirical Basis of the Environmental Kuznets Curve

We examine the conceptual and empirical basis of the environmental Kuznets curve. From both perspectives, the relationship lacks firm foundations. In particular, the empirical relationship is shown to be highly sensitive to the choice of pollutant, sample of countries and time period. This strongly suggests that there is an omitted variables problem. We find that two important omitted variables are education and inequality. Also, we show that the observed relationship is sensitive to the measure of income/welfare used. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications of our findings. ( JEL O13, Q21, Q28, Q32)     

Does Tax Evasion Affect Economic Crime?*

This paper examines the effect of tax evasion on criminal activities in Italy. Specifically, we consider three types of crime that are related to economic determinants: property crimes (including robbery, theft and car theft), fraud and usury. We estimate different econometric models using annual data from the Italian provinces (NUTS-3 level) for the 2004–12 period. We find that tax evasion positively affects economic crimes, and our results suggest that tax evasion is an incentive to engage in criminal activities, in addition to more standard determinants that we include in the analysis, such as labour market opportunities and deterrence. Moreover, these crimes demonstrate different levels of persistence over time and reflect different adjustment costs.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management

This paper examines whether firms substituted real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory. Using a sample of 101,331 firm-year observations from 33 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that IFRS adoption came with the unintended consequence of certain firms substituting real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management, especially among firms in countries with strict enforcement regimes. Furthermore, we document that the trade-off is confined to EU countries in which strong firm-level characteristics (i.e. the firm-level mechanism of control, the market’s level of scrutiny, and firm-specific incentives to provide transparency) are coupled with strong enforcement. We also show that IFRS had an effect in countries outside the EU, albeit at a different time. Overall, the results suggest that accounting regulators’ efforts to increase earnings quality might have had the unintended consequence of increasing real earnings management activities.     

Relationships with managers and harassment: the Italian nurse experience

This paper examines the link between workplace relationships with management and work harassment for Italian nurses. The relationship with the supervisor was a key predictor of work harassment, and work harassment was found to have a major negative effect on engagement. There are significant differences in nurses’ perceptions of work harassment, engagement and job satisfaction for public and private sector nurses.     

RELIGIONS,FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We investigate the extent to which the pronatalism of religions impedes growth via the fertility/education channel. Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.     

Poverty trap,boom and bust periods and growth. A nonlinear model for non-developed and developing countries

This work investigates the qualitative and quantitative dynamics of a Solow–Swan growth model with differential savings as proposed by Böhm and Kaas (J Econ Dyn Control 24:965–980, 2000) assuming the shifted Cobb–Douglas (SCD) production function (see Capasso et al. in Nonlinear Anal. 11:3858–3876, 2010) which makes it possible to consider the long-run dynamics of non-developed and developing countries as well as that of developed economies. The resulting model is described by a nonlinear discontinuous map generating both a poverty trap and complex dynamics. Furthermore, multistability phenomena may emerge: besides the “vicious circle of poverty”, long-run behaviours may include boom and bust periods. Complex basins can emerge, hence, economic policies trying to raise the capital per capita may fail and economies may be captured by the poverty trap.