The private equity business model and associated strategies for HRM: evidence and implications?

Are private equity firms significant actors in the UK market for corporate control? Do they represent a new organizational form befitting a new business model? What are the direct and indirect pressures on management that flow from the diffusion of this business model and its associated organizational form? In terms of human resource management does acquisition by private equity have a significant or negligible effect? This paper looks at the development and diffusion of private equity and the ‘take private’ private equity business model (PEBM) and the effects of these on the management of HR. In addition to this the paper evaluates the PEBM within comparative institutional approaches to international business and HRM.     

TESTS OF EQUAL FORECAST ACCURACY FOR OVERLAPPING MODELS

This paper examines the asymptotic and finite‐sample properties of tests of equal forecast accuracy when the models being compared are overlapping in the sense of Vuong (Econometrica 1989; 57 : 307–333). Two models are overlapping when the true model contains just a subset of variables common to the larger sets of variables included in the competing forecasting models. We consider an out‐of‐sample version of the two‐step testing procedure recommended by Vuong but also show that an exact one‐step procedure is sometimes applicable. When the models are overlapping, we provide a simple‐to‐use fixed‐regressor wild bootstrap that can be used to conduct valid inference. Monte Carlo simulations generally support the theoretical results: the two‐step procedure is conservative, while the one‐step procedure can be accurately sized when appropriate. We conclude with an empirical application comparing the predictive content of credit spreads to growth in real stock prices for forecasting US real gross domestic product growth. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Happiness,income and poverty

There is considerable evidence from a variety of sources to suggest that well-being is a function of relative income. These findings have been used to explain the Easterlin Paradox, whereby a rise in income for all does not lead to a rise in average happiness in a country (even though the cross section relationship between income and happiness is positive). This relativity of utility has led to calls for policy to focus away from GDP. I here first discuss some of the evidence that well-being is indeed relative in income, but then consider two relatively little-analysed issues to suggest that there may continue to be a role for GDP per capita in happiness-based policy: the inequality of subjective well-being, and the specific case of those in income poverty.     

Contingent payments in selection contests

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).     

Job satisfaction and gender: Why are women so happy at work?

By most objective standards, women's jobs are worse than men's, yet women report higher levels of job satisfaction than do men. This paper uses a recent large-scale British survey to document the extent of this gender differential for eight measures of job satisfaction and to evaluate the proposition that identical men and women in identical jobs should be equally satisfied. Neither the different jobs that men and women do, their different work values, nor sample selection account for the gender satisfaction differential. The paper's proposed explanation appeals to the notion of relative well-being, especially relative to workers' expectations. An identical man and woman with the same jobs and expectations would indeed report identical job satisfaction, but women's expectations are argued to be lower than men's. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the gender satisfaction differential disappears for the young, the higher-educated, professionals and those in male-dominated workplaces, for all of whom there is less likely to be a gender difference in job expectations.     

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.     

Theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings and political connections: firms level evidence from a developing economy

In this paper, we revisit the theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings while concentrating on the effect of political connections. In particular, we postulate two competing hypotheses for the effects that political connections can have on cash holdings: ‘substitution effect hypothesis’ and ‘complementary effect hypothesis’. Using the data on Pakistani firms over the period 2002–2010, we find that connected firms hold significantly larger cash reserves than their non-connected counterparts, thus confirming the ‘complementary hypothesis’, which suggests that agency problems lead connected firms to accumulate large amount of cash. Further, this effect is found to be more pronounced in dictatorial as opposed to democratic regimes indicating the presence of higher degrees of political patronage in that period. Finally, we also find differences in the complementary effect based on firm characteristics. Our results suggest that the firm size and leverage have increasing effects on the cash holdings of connected firms, contrary to the mainstream literature standpoint.     

Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation

Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored.     

Private equity, ‘union recognition’ and value extraction at the Automobile Association: The GMB as an emergency service?

This article evaluates union recognition and ‘value extraction’ in a private equity buy‐out. The article reviews private equity, investor value and ownership interests, details union recognition at the Automobile Association (AA) before and after its acquisition by private equity, and reviews the GMB's wider campaign of opposition to private equity ownership.