Governance and the decision to issue a profit warning

The theoretical concept of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (2005) are used to study the relationship between the quality of a firm's governance and its decision to issue a profit warning (PW) when it is overvalued. Based on a sample of Canadian companies between 2000 and 2004, results were only partially supportive of the hypotheses. The characteristics of the board seem to play only a secondary role in the decision to issue a profit warning when the firm is overvalued. On the other hand, as expected, governance mechanisms that factor in market values to align the interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders are negatively related to the profit warning decision. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bimetallism: The “rules of the game”

Based on historical evidence found in Juglar and Bonnet that over the Bimetallic period French and British central banks did co-operate when using their discount rates as policy instruments for currency stabilization, we test whether Bimetallism was a regulated system or not. Our revised story of Bimetallism contrasts the existing literature which identifies this regime as a self-equilibrating system, constrained by specie points.     

Project management practice,generic or contextual: A reality check

The purpose of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of project management practice by investigating the use of project management tools and techniques and the levels of support provided by organizations for their use. The study examines both general levels of use and variations among project types and contexts. Many aspects of project management practice are common to most projects in most contexts, while others vary significantly among different types of projects and among projects in different contexts. The purpose of this paper is to present empirical results that show both the common elements and the significant variations. The paper is based on a survey of 750 project management practitioners. The use of tools and techniques is seen here as an indicator of the realities of practice. The study found some aspects of practice to be common across all types of projects and all contexts, but on this background of similar patterns of practice, several statistically significant differences have also been identified. The primary focus of this paper is on these variations in practice.     

Dividend sensitivity to economic factors,stock valuation,and long-run risk

In this paper, we develop a theoretical stock valuation model that takes into account the long-run sensitivity of dividends to various economic factors. Our valuation process integrates the multidimensionality of uncertainty, as well as the long-run concept of risk (recently proposed in the literature). More precisely, we demonstrate that a stock’s long-run dividend growth is negatively related to its current dividend–price ratio and linearly related to N sensitivity coefficients, given by the long-run sensitivity between dividends and economic factors. Then, we show that the equilibrium price of a stock is a function of its current dividend, long-run dividend growth, and N risk parameters.     

CEO Attributes,Board Composition,and Acquirer Value Creation: A Canadian Study

We examined CEO attributes, board composition, and ownership structure for their relationship to the share performance of the acquiring company around the acquisition announcement. Based on 273 acquisitions by Canadian firms from 1998 through 2002, we have shown that the levels of CEO and director ownership as well as the level of board independence were positively associated with the short‐term financial performance of the acquirer. Board size was negatively related to value creation. Finally, cash‐based deals and cross‐border transactions were also positively related to increases in shareholder wealth for the acquirer. Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

La théorie économique dominante: une représentation fausse et immorale de la société

This paper argues that the dominant mainstream neo‐classical economic theory propounds a world‐view which is based not simply on half‐truths, but on straight lies. This is particularly significant since the influence of the economic world‐view reaches into every realm of social thought. Although overtly grounded in utilitarianism, the basis of neo‐classical thought has undergone two shifts of meaning which have converted the original self‐evident utilitarian presuppositions into an ideology. The first of these alters the utilitarian proposition that ‘we seek satisfaction’ into the statement that ‘we only seek satisfaction’. It follows that human action is motivated by nothing other than selfishness and greed, and that altruism therefore cannot exist: anything that looks like altruism is therefore nothing other than egoism in disguise, and there is no place for ethical reasoning in individual choice. The second shift alters the premise that our goal is ‘maximum satisfaction’ to the assertion that what we seek is ‘maximum monetary gain’. This shift is already present in the writings of Jeremy Bentham, and forms the basis of much subsequent work in economics. In particular, it has facilitated the emergence of what one might term ‘economic imperialism’, i.e. the use of economic theory to analyse social issues – family size, racial discrimination, marriage, education choices, among others. In all of these cases monetary gain is the paramount criterion. For business ethics the most obvious example here is the absolutisation of profit as the sole criterion of business achievements, and of salary as the sole criterion of work choice and worker satisfaction. Both of these premises are then used to demonstrate that it is free competition which will ensure maximum social welfare. This conclusion is both relativistic and reductionistic. In the first place, the necessary conditions for perfect competition can never exist. Nor can ‘optimum social welfare’ be translated into ‘optimum welfare for all’ in an economic world‐view which sees wealth and poverty as the ‘just deserts’ of hard work and laziness respectively. The dominant economic theory is thus explicitly immoral in that it enshrines the absolute sovereignity of the individual and the law of the jungle as social norms. The qualitative measure of human happiness is desire, the quantitative measure is money. From an ethical perspective we must reject the falsity of this world‐view.     

Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.     

Neyman type A distribution revisited

The modality structure of the Neyman type A distribution is examined. The results obtained add to those previously stated in Barton (1957) (or in Johnson et al. (1992, p. 370) ) and in Shenton and Bowman (1967) . Strong unimodality of this distribution is also considered. Problem 328 in Statistica Neerlandica ( Theodorescu (1997) ) and its solution ( Borwein (2000) ) play an important part.