Explaining International Differences in Genetically Modified Food Labeling Policies*

Many countries have adopted labeling policies for genetically modified (GM) food, and the regulations vary considerably across countries. We evaluate the importance of political‐economic factors implicit in the choice of GM food labeling regulations. Using an analytical model, we show that production and trade‐related interests play a prominent role in labeling decision‐making. This conclusion is validated by an empirical analysis of GM food labeling policy choices. We find that countries producing GM crops are more likely to have less stringent labeling policies. Food and feed exporters to the European Union (EU) and Japan are more likely to have adopted stricter labeling policies. Labeling regulations in Asia and Europe are similar to those of Japan and the EU. Countries with no labeling policies are less developed, with important rural sectors and are more likely to have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.     

Food shopping and town centre vitality: exploring the link

Retail decentralization is associated with town centre decline and a concern for revitalization. Using the case of Llanelli, South Wales, the effects of a new food superstore on shopping behaviours and opinions are explored. Surveys in 1997, 1999 and 2001 reveal a dramatic change in patterns of food shopping, but no real change for purchases of clothing or DIY goods. Disadvantaged consumers, the carless and the elderly, were already heavily reliant on town centre shops before the opening of the new superstore and changes in their shopping patterns were no different from other shoppers. The 'social' vitality of the town centre increased, as did shoppers' satisfaction with town centre shopping, but major spin-off shopping or 'economic' vitality has not yet occurred.     

Sinking Ships? Liberal Theorists on the American Economy

In the Asia-Pacific region, the conditions and consequences of East Asian success have understandably attracted more attention than the causes and implications of North American failure. In the American case, any failure must be relative when the US remains a bloc-sized market and the only surviving superpower. Thus, for Asians the US figures economically as an export opportunity and socially, for puritans like Lee Kuan Yew, as a warning about decadence. The discussion among Americans is altogether more interesting. This article analyses the debate about national competitiveness among American liberal democrats like Magaziner, Reich, Tyson and Krugman and looks behind the differences of position that separate these protagonists, with two conclusions. First, as the old 1980s problem of national uncompetitivencss is jettisoned in the 1990s; all the liberals now agree that Americans are no longer in the same boat, that while some are becoming increasingly successful, others are sinking fast. Second; the protagonists have moved from an industrial policy fix in the 1980s to an end of policy era in the 1990s where the question for American liberals is whether and how the political system can absorb the stresses createted by increasing inequality.     

The Origins of the German Corporation - Finance, Ownership and Control

The ownership of German corporations is quite different today from that of Anglo-American firms. How did this come about? To what extent is it attributable to regulation? A specially constructed data set on financing and ownership of German corporations from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century reveals that, as in the UK, there was a high degree of activity on German stock markets with firms issuing equity in preference to borrowing from banks, and insider and family ownership declining rapidly. However, unlike in the UK, other companies and banks emerged as the main holders of equity, with banks holding shares primarily as custodians of other investors rather than on their own account. The changing pattern of ownership concentration was therefore very different from that of the UK with regulation reinforcing the control that banks exercised on behalf of other investors.     

A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information

This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach” the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoffs. All players optimize noisily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE) and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experimental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpublished sessions, the model fits substantially better than chance and much better than standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience.