Variation diminishing property of densities of uniform generalized order statistics

Let f _*,r , r ≥ 1, denote the density function of rth uniform generalized order statistics as defined by Kamps (1995) or Cramer and Kamps (2003). We prove the following variation diminishing property: the number of zeros in (0,1) of any linear combination does not exceed the number of sign changes in the sequence (a ₁, . . . ,a _r ). This result is applied to study monotonicity and convexity properties of f _*,r .     

Characterization of Normal Distribution Related to Two Samples Based on Regression

Characterization of normal distribution related to two samples based on second conditional moments has been obtained. This characterization has been transformed to a characterization based on the UMVU estimators of the density function. These results are generalized to k samples from normal distributions. Finally applications of these characterization results to goodness-of-fit test are discussed.     

Information value and efficiency measurement for risk-averse firms

This paper has three goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility (linear-in-probabilities) preferences and a general stochastic technology. Second, we place bounds on the value of information for a risk-averse firm and relate these bounds to characteristics of the technology and the producer’s preferences. The third and final goal is to derive the implications that information differences can have for measured efficiency differences and to relate the bounds on the value of information to those measured differences.      

On Minimally-supported <Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>-optimal Designs for Polynomial Regression with Log-concave Weight Function

This paper studies minimally-supported D-optimal designs for polynomial regression model with logarithmically concave (log-concave) weight functions. Many commonly used weight functions in the design literature are log-concave. For example, and exp(−x ²) in Theorem 2.3.2 of Fedorov (Theory of optimal experiments, 1972) are all log-concave. We show that the determinant of information matrix of minimally-supported design is a log-concave function of ordered support points and the D-optimal design is unique. Therefore, the numerically D-optimal designs can be constructed efficiently by cyclic exchange algorithm.     

The impact of stress on tournament entry

Individual willingness to enter competitive environments predicts career choices and labor market outcomes. Meanwhile, many people experience competitive contexts as stressful. We use two laboratory experiments to investigate whether factors related to stress can help explain individual differences in tournament entry. Experiment 1 studies whether stress responses (measured as salivary cortisol) to taking part in a mandatory tournament predict individual willingness to participate in a voluntary tournament. We find that competing increases stress levels. This cortisol response does not predict tournament entry for men but is positively and significantly correlated with choosing to enter the tournament for women. In Experiment 2, we exogenously induce physiological stress using the cold-pressor task. We find a positive causal effect of stress on tournament entry for women but no effect for men. Finally, we show that although the effect of stress on tournament entry differs between the genders, stress reactions cannot explain the well-documented gender difference in willingness to compete.     

Do casinos pay their customers to become risk-averse? Revising the house money effect in a field experiment

The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino.     

Is time-variant information stickiness state-dependent?

This paper estimates information stickiness with regard to inflation expectations in the United States and the Eurozone for the 1981/06–2015/12 and 1998/Q4–2015/Q2 periods, respectively, and further investigates whether such information stickiness is state-dependent. Based on a bootstrap sub-sample rolling-window estimation, we find that information stickiness varies over time, which contradicts the strict time dependency implied under sticky-information theory. We provide evidence that information stickiness depends on inflation volatility, which indicates that information stickiness is state-dependent and that it has a time trend. Using a threshold model, we estimate structural changes in the state-dependence and time-trend of information stickiness. The results show that information stickiness has been more dependent on inflation volatility and has had a higher time-trend in both regions following the 2008 financial crisis.     

Do people really want to be nudged towards healthy lifestyles?

This paper assesses Thaler and Sunstein’s claim that policies that nudge individuals towards healthy lifestyles promote the welfare of those individuals, as judged by themselves. I argue that Thaler and Sunstein switch between two different interpretations of that clause. One interpretation gives the clause a wide range of applicability, but drains it of its content as a repudiation of paternalism. The other interpretation makes it more meaningful to say that people want to make the choices they are being nudged towards, but applies to a much narrower range of cases than Thaler and Sunstein have in mind.     

Happiness,income and poverty

There is considerable evidence from a variety of sources to suggest that well-being is a function of relative income. These findings have been used to explain the Easterlin Paradox, whereby a rise in income for all does not lead to a rise in average happiness in a country (even though the cross section relationship between income and happiness is positive). This relativity of utility has led to calls for policy to focus away from GDP. I here first discuss some of the evidence that well-being is indeed relative in income, but then consider two relatively little-analysed issues to suggest that there may continue to be a role for GDP per capita in happiness-based policy: the inequality of subjective well-being, and the specific case of those in income poverty.     

On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium

Cooperative behavior is often observed in ordinary market transactions. To account for this observation, Robert Sugden proposes a team reasoning theory in which the common interest of team reasoners is defined by the notion of mutually beneficial practice. We study the relationships between mutually beneficial practices and Berge equilibria (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). We propose two sufficient conditions under which a (strict) Berge equilibrium is a mutually beneficial practice.