UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

The local economic impact of construction projects in a small and relatively self-contained economy: The case of Lancaster University

Whilst the local multiplier impacts of the annual operation of universities has been the subject of intensive research, the economic impacts of capital construction projects have been almost completely ignored. This paper presents the results of detailed analysis of capital projects at Lancaster University in 1993-The reasons for the radically different annual operation and construction multipliers estimated in the Lancaster study are examined. Despite the smaller size of construction multipliers it is argued that it is a serious mistake to estimate local construction multipliers by making simplifying assumptions on the size of the key parameters in the multiplier equations.     

Editor's Introduction: Symposium on Free-Market Competitive Goals and Antitrust Policies

Review of Industrial Organization -     

From edgeworth to fisher to vickrey: A comment on Michael J. Boskin's Vickrey lecture

Irving Fisher has been overlooked as an influence on William Vickrey's work on taxation and as a link between Edgeworth and Vickrey. Vickrey was Fisher's last and greatest student.     

A Study of Arbitrage Efficiency Between the FTSE‐100 Index Futures and Options Contracts

Despite the importance of the London markets and the significance of the relationship for market makers, little published research is available on arbitrage between the FTSE‐100 Index futures and the FTSE‐100 European index options contracts. This study uses the put–call–futures parity condition to throw light on the relationship between options and futures written against the FTSE Index. The arbitrage methodology adopted in this study avoids many of the problems that have affected prior research on the relationship between options or futures prices and the underlying index. The problems that arise from nonsynchroneity between options and futures prices are reduced by the matching of options and futures prices within narrow time intervals with time‐stamped transaction data. This study allows for realistic trading and market‐impact costs. The feasibility of strategies such as execute‐and‐hold and early unwinding is examined with both ex‐post and ex‐ante simulation tests that take into consideration possible execution time lags for the arbitrage trade. This study reveals that the occurrence of matched put–call–futures trios exhibits a U‐shaped intraday pattern with a concentration at both open and close, although the magnitude of observed mispricings has no discernible intraday pattern. Ex‐post arbitrage profits for traders facing transaction costs are concentrated in at‐the‐money options. As in other major markets, despite important microstructure differences, opportunities are generally rapidly extinguished in less than 3 min. The results suggest that arbitrage opportunities for traders facing transaction costs are small in number and confirm the efficiency of trading on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:31–58, 2002     

The baby boom, the baby bust, and the housing market A second look

I re-examine Mankiw-Weil's (MW) claim that house prices will fall 47% by 2007. MW argue that the arrival of the Baby Boom generation at adulthood drove up prices during the 1970s. When the beginnings of the Baby Bust generation matured in the 1980s, prices softened. When this generation arrives in earnest, prices will collapse. I make three points: (1) The regression upon which MW hang their prediction has an implausible -8.1% trend, which drives their prediction. (2) Demand directly influences the rental price; the asset price (MW's variable) is influenced by demand only indirectly. I re-run MW's regression, replacing the asset price with the rental price, and their prediction disappears. (3) Relying on data presented by MW, I show that housing consumption rose during the 1970s, after adjusting for income growth. Just when MW say the asset price of housing was rising, consumers behaved as if the price were falling. Consumers were right: The rental price fell by approximately 20% during the 1970s.