International Pricing in a Generalized Model of Ideal Variety

We examine international markups and pricing in a generalized version of an "ideal variety" model. In this model, entry causes crowding in variety space, so that the marginal utility of new varieties falls as market size grows. Crowding is partially offset by income effects, as richer consumers will pay more for varieties closer matched to their ideal types. We show theoretically and confirm empirically that declining marginal utility of new varieties results in: a higher own-price elasticity of demand (and lower prices) in large countries and a lower own-price elasticity of demand (and higher prices) in rich countries. The model is also useful for generating facts from the literature regarding cross-country differences in the rate of variety expansion.     

The Tax Incidence of Lotteries: Evidence from Five States

The nature of revenue generation for state‐sponsored lotteries has been an issue of public debate for quite some time. Although most studies have found lotteries to have a regressive tax incidence, several have concluded otherwise. Unfortunately, the vast majority of academic studies address this concern by examining the tax incidence of only one state's lottery and/or by using only one time period's data. In addition, many assessments of the tax impact of lotteries fail to consider other demographic variables that may influence purchase patterns and, thus, be of interest to policymakers. To remedy this, the current paper assesses the incidence of the lottery excise tax for five states using county level data spanning multiple years. Also assessed are changes in incidence across demographic groups as the lotteries matured. Lottery tax incidence is assessed with multiple regression estimates of the income elasticity of demand for lottery products. The predominant finding is that the lottery tax for these states had a regressive incidence. Otherwise, few consistencies in either change in lottery tax incidence or purchase patterns across demographic variables were found.     

Cost Savings from Check 21 Electronic Payment Legislation

Electronic payment legislation permitted an initially paper substitute digital image of a check, and later the electronic digital image of a check, to be processed and presented for payment on a same‐day basis. By shifting to electronic collection and presentment, Federal Reserve per item check processing costs fell by over 70%, reducing estimated overall U.S. payment system costs by $1.16 billion in 2010. Payment collection times and associated float fell dramatically for collecting banks and payees with consequent additional savings in firm working capital costs of perhaps $1.37 billion and indebted consumer benefits of $0.64 billion.     

THE ROLE OF COST IN DETERMINING WHEN FIRMS OFFER BUNDLES*

We model competitive bundling and tying, allowing for marginal cost savings from bundling, fixed costs of product offerings, and variation in customer preferences. Pure bundling can arise either because few people demand only one component or because, with high fixed costs, a single product efficiently satisfies customers with diverse tastes. We conclude by analyzing empirically the bundling of pain relievers with decongestants. The discount for the bundled product is large. We argue that our model provides a simpler, more compelling explanation for the size of the discount than the demand‐centered approach to bundling by a monopolist.     

Optimal Dissent in Organizations

We model an organization as a two-agent hierarchy: an informed Decision Maker in charge of selecting projects and a (possibly) uninformed Implementer in charge of their execution. Both have intrinsic preferences over projects. This paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences, that is, dissent within the organization. Dissent is useful to (1) foster the use of objective (and sometimes private) information in decision making and (2) give credibility to the Decision Maker's choices. However, dissent comes at the cost of hurting the Implementer's intrinsic motivation, thereby impairing organizational efficiency. We show that dissent can be optimal, in particular, when information is useful and uncertainty is high. Moreover, dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when Implementers can choose their employer or when Decision Makers have real authority over hiring decisions.

Workers do, and managers figure out what to do.
                                            F. Knight (1921)

     

Attitudes of Businessmen,Consumers, and Consumerists Toward Consumerism

Despite the apparent concern about consumerism issues by various groups, it appears that much of this concern has been based on speculation and casual observations. There is a paucity of empirical research regarding attitudes toward consumerism. This study is the first to assess the attitudes of businessmen, consumers and consumerists—all from the same geographic and market environmenttoward several important consumerism issues. The results, which show significant differences in various areas, have important policy implications for consumerists, politicians and businessmen.     

UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS: IMPACTS ON LOCAL AND U.S. ECONOMIES

In the past two decades, many universities have established Offices of Technology Transfer to increase the transfer rate of certain research innovations to the private sector. More recently, some of these offices have come under pressure to increase their performance and thereby stimulate local economies. This paper discusses various technology transfer methods and presents results of a survey of university Offices of Technology Transfer. Comparisons of these offices take into account size, focus, and differences in public and private universities' goals. The paper concludes by discussing potential pitfalls of technology transfer and of privatizing university research.