Consumer decision making and the nature of the product: A comparison of husband and wife adoption process location

Many studies investigating consumer decision making have implicitly assumed that one individual in a family (most often the wife) makes all of the consumption choices for the family. This study investigated and compared the independent responses of husbands and wives concerning their adoption process location for a series of products. Significant response discrepancies were observed, primarily for products for which the adoption decision likely involves lower levels of involvement. Relatively little agreement was observed between husbands and wives on whether a product was adopted. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Sunday shopping and promotion possibilities

This is an empirical study of the Sunday shopper. Demographic data, motives and attitudes and the Sunday Shopping trip are all examined. Cues from the empirical information are identified for possible use in developing an effective promotional strategy.     

Exact Utilities under Alternative Monetary Rules in a Simple Macro Model with Optimizing Agents

We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the representative agent. Fully optimal policy can attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Fully optimal policy is contrasted with both naive and sophisticated simple rules that involve, respectively, complete stabilization and optimal stabilization of one variable or a combination two variables. With wage contracts, outcomes depend crucially on whether there are also price contracts. For example, if labor supply is relatively inelastic, for productivity shocks, nominal income stabilization yields higher welfare when there are no price contracts. However, with price contracts, outcomes are independent of whether there are wage contracts, except, of course, for the nominal wage.     

European Integration and Production in the French Economy

Effects of greater European integration on the French economy are explored with an aggregate cost function. Input direct price elasticities are inelastic, but greatest (absolute value) for capital and lowest for imports. Cross-price elasticities suggest inputs are substitutes and are higher for domestic inputs than domestic input and imports pairs. As trade restrictions fall, effects on domestic input demand may increase as substitution elasticities rise. Inverse output supply price elasticities indicate domestic input prices are relatively important factors affecting consumption goods prices and import prices more important for investment goods. Thus, import price decreases may stimulate investment and growth. (JEL F14 , O10 , O12 )     

Brett Williams. Debt for Sale: A Social History of the Credit Trap. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 154 pp. ISBN 0-8122-3817-6, $24.95 (cloth).

This volume covers a social history of modern consumer credit,specifically, credit card debt, pawnshops, and storefronts thatoffer check-cashing services and paycheck loans. Consumer creditis largely a product of the past half century. Diners Club issuedits first credit cards in 1951, and Carte Blanche, AmericanExpress, and other entities soon followed suit. In the 1970sthe advent of computers and the deregulation of banking resultedin an explosion in the use of credit cards. Initially, credit     

Conditional behavior and learning in similar stag hunt games

This paper reports an experiment using Stag Hunt games with different payoff ranges. Specifically, in one treatment for half of the games the payoff dominant and the risk dominant equilibrium coincide and for the other half of the games they conflict; in the second treatment they always conflict. The experiment provides evidence that the payoff range experienced by the participant influences the likelihood of efficient conventions emerging. In particular, experiencing games where payoff dominance and risk dominance coincide appears to make payoff dominance more attractive in games in which they conflict. In the experiment, we also observe conditional behavior emerging with experience. We develop a model of conditional expectations to explain these stylized facts that depends crucially on the assumption that after a brief learning period participants categorize their experience using the same relative bandwidth in both treatments even though the range of experience is twice as large in treatment 1 as it is in treatment 2. The assumption cannot be rejected by the data. The analysis provides a formal example in which increasing experienced diversity by changing the way similar experiences are categorized increases the likelihood of efficient conventions emerging in communities playing similar Stag Hunt games.