Food shopping and town centre vitality: exploring the link

Retail decentralization is associated with town centre decline and a concern for revitalization. Using the case of Llanelli, South Wales, the effects of a new food superstore on shopping behaviours and opinions are explored. Surveys in 1997, 1999 and 2001 reveal a dramatic change in patterns of food shopping, but no real change for purchases of clothing or DIY goods. Disadvantaged consumers, the carless and the elderly, were already heavily reliant on town centre shops before the opening of the new superstore and changes in their shopping patterns were no different from other shoppers. The 'social' vitality of the town centre increased, as did shoppers' satisfaction with town centre shopping, but major spin-off shopping or 'economic' vitality has not yet occurred.     

THE INCOME AND CONSUMPTION EXPERIENCES OF A SAMPLE OF FARM FAMILIES*

The way in which the consumption of farm families is adjusted to fluctuations in income has important implications at the national, regional and farm levels. In this paper, hypotheses about the consumption of farm families are examined using data from 16 families in a wheat-sheep region of New South Wales for the eight-year period 1968/69 to 1975/76. The results of the study indicate that lagged effects are important in explaining consumption by farm households. It was not possible to partition these lag effects between partial adjustment and normal income influences. Estimates of the short-run (one-year) marginal propensity to consume (mpc) were quite low, ranging from 0.13 to 0.16. The best estimates of the long-run mpc ranged from 0.19 to 0.25.     

Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition

Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. Furthermore, if the earnings function displays constant elasticity, the choice of education should not be distorted. With the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs

Delay costs play a role in Coasean bargaining over environmental conflicts when an injunction restricts actions until a settlement is reached. Results from the lab suggest that efficiency remained relatively robust to discrete and increasing marginal delay costs, but declined significantly with nonincreasing marginal delay costs. Bargainers appear to deal with probability and consequences separately rather than in combination as maintained by expected utility theory, and as such, neglect ends over means. How the distribution of wealth is best organized depends on perspective: constrained self-interest best organizes behavior if expected utility is maintained; pure self-interest dominates if we acknowledge the probability–consequence heuristic.