Downtown parking meter demand in a border metropolitan economy

Prior research establishes that the price of parking in the city centre often impacts the decision to travel downtown and the mode of transportation utilized. Other factors that influence the decision to drive and park downtown have received less attention. This study uses time series data to analyse the demand for metered parking spaces in El Paso, Texas, USA. In addition to meter rates, the determinants of demand include personal income, gasoline prices and the price of a substitute good, parking garage spaces. Because international bridges connect downtown El Paso to neighbouring Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, the impacts of trans-boundary traffic flows, bridge tolls and other cross-border economic variables are also included as potential determinants of metered parking demand. Results indicate that parking meter rates, other transportation-related costs, and economic conditions in both countries affect meter use.     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.     

On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: workers' rents also matter

Abstract .  In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled.     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.     

A revised concept of distributional equity

Recent studies have shown that in a private goods economy with production, allocations which are considered to be distributionally fair may not exist. As a solution for such cases, just allocations are introduced and examined in some detail. Such allocations are shown, by rigorous proof, to exist in general.     

Estimating the Private Economic Benefits of Sons Versus Daughters in India

In order to understand the economic incentives behind gender discrimination in India, this paper provides the first estimates of the magnitude of the economic benefits of having a son instead of a daughter. The study estimates large gains from a first-born son to per capita income and expenditure, household assets, and a reduction in the probability the household is below the poverty line. Estimates show that a first-born son may provide economic advantages through a reduction in total children born and also from an adult son’s labor supply contribution to his parents’ household. The observed pattern of incentives is also compared with observed patterns in sex selection as a test of whether the relative economic value of first-born sons and daughters can explain the prevalence of sex-selective abortion.