Robustness to the unavailability of data in block designs

We present general results for finding or boundingt _maxB , the maximum number of arbitrary whole blocks of observations which can be removed from a block design, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable. The block sizes may be larger than the number of treatments. The results are applied to BBDs, reinforced BIBDs and BBDs, BTIBDs, and a series of variance balanced incomplete block designs with two block sizes. Also given for most of these designs, are results fort _max, the maximum number of arbitrary, scattered observations that can become unavailable, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable.The work was undertaken while Dr. Whittinghill was visiting Ohio State University, and supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences Division, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.     

A comparison of approximately optimal stratification given proportional allocation with other methods of stratification and allocation

Summary In this article, we shall present an approximately optimal method for constructing stratum boundary points when the sample is allocated proportionally. The method is based on an equal partitioning of the cumulative off ^1/3, wheref is the distribution of the stratification variable. We show that in many practical situations this technique compares favourably with approximately optimal stratification and allocation methods previously suggested.

---

Zusammenfassung In diesem Artikel stellen wir eine annähernd optimale Methode zur Festlegung von Stratabegrenzungspunkten dar, die für proportional angeordnete Samples gilt. Die Methode basiert auf einer gleichen Einteilung derf ^1/3-Kummulation, wobeif die Verteilung der Stratifikations-variablen darstellt. Wir zeigen, daß diese Technik in vielen praktischen Fällen gegenüber den bisher vorgeschlagenen Methoden zur optimalen Stratifikation und Zuordnung nicht schlecht abschneidet.

     

Finding a lasting cure for U.S. health care

In "Making Competition in Health Care Work" (July-August 1994), Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Michael E. Porter, and Gregory B. Brown ask a question that has been absent from the national debate on health care reform: How can the United States achieve sustained cost reductions while at the same time maintaining quality of care? The authors argue that innovation driven by rigorous competition is the key to successful reform. A lasting cure for health care in the United States should include four basic elements: corrected incentives to spur productive competition, universal insurance to secure economic efficiency, relevant information to ensure meaningful choice, and innovation to guarantee dynamic improvement. In this issue's Perspectives section, eleven experts examine the current state of the health care system and offer their views on the shape that reform should take. Some excerpts: "On the road to innovation, let us not forget to develop the tools that allow physicians, payers, and patients to make better decisions." I. Steven Udvarhelyi; "Health care is not a product or service that can be standardized, packaged, marketed, or adequately judged by consumers according to quality and price." Arnold S. Relman; "Just as antitrust laws are the wise restraints that make competition free in other sectors of the economy, so the right kind of managed competition can work well in health care." Edward M. Kennedy "Biomedical research should be considered primarily an investment in the national economic well-being with additional humanitarian benefits." Elizabeth Marincola.     

Employee benefit packages for part-time workers

To successfully recruit and retain part-time workers in the decade ahead, managers will need to design more attractive employee benefit packages. This article examines which benefits part-time workers receive and value the most and which benefits they would like to receive.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Aspekte einer Neugestaltung des Rechtes der Versicherungsvermittlung

The current fundamental reform of the German insurance law cannot and will not stop short of the law of insurance mediation. Up to now Sec. 43 to 48 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG = German Insurance Act) govern only one type of insurance intermediary known as insurance agent. The act only sets up rules to which extent the insurance agent has authority to bind the insurer. In the way the law is construed by the courts it differs in many aspects from the written law. Thus it is suggested to define the generic term ?insurance intermediary“ in the act as well as the subcategories ?insurance broker“ and ?insurance agent“, whereby the term ?insurance agent“ also includes the field staff employed by an insurer. In connection with the diffi-cult distinction between insurance brokers and insurance agents it remains questionable on which type of intermediary the rules regulating the relationship between agents and insurants and thereby protecting the potential customers should be applied accordingly. This controversial and in practice significant question should be explicitly decided by the legislator for reasons of legal certainty. In so far Sec. 43a of the Austrian Insurance Act could act as a model function. Regarding the insurance agents’ authority to receive (Empfangsvertretungsmacht des Versicherungsvertreters) for the insurer propositions exist to explicitly declare Sec. 43 No.l VVG, which grants the agent the authority to receive when accepting a contractual offer for the insurer, as mandatory. This suggestion would be in accordance with the current case law. Furthermore the wording of Sec. 43 No.l VVG should be altered so that the insurants’ pre-contractual risk-notifications, which the prevailing opinion already regards as being included, is explicitly mentioned. In principle Sec. 43 No.2 WG, which grants the agent the authority to receive notifications and representations for the duration of the insurance contract, should be declared as mandatory, too. Exempted should be the authority to receive for dispositions regarding the entitlements to benefits from (life) insurance contracts and the right to receive the insured sum. Sec. 44 WG, which strongly restricts the attribution of the agent’s knowledge to the insurer, is unconvincing, especially from a legal policy point of view. Therefore it is to be cancelled without substitution. Finally the legislator should refrain from codifying the customary liability based on the principles of reliance.